The Experimenters

2 John Cage’s Chance Protocols

2   John Cage’s Chance Protocols

1

2Where do we go from here? Towards theatre. That art more than music resembles nature.

3John Cage, 1957

4Defining exactly what constituted an ‘‘experimental’’ artistic practice was a

5 consistent feature of intellectual life at Black Mountain College, and these de-

6 bates moved into an intense new phase after World War II. As the previous

7chapter set forward, one consequence of the close connection between John

8 Dewey and the College’s Bauhaus-derived (‘‘Albersian,’’ as we could describe

9 the Bauhaus influence at Black Mountain) model of art pedagogy was that ex-

10 perimentation came to be understood as a creative process, nonetheless one

11 characterized by degrees of preparation, considered intention, and technical

12 competence. Similarly, the art practices and pedagogy of Black Mountain’s ear-

13 ly Albersian-Deweyan period—from the year of its founding in 1933 to approx-

14 imately the end of the Second World War—sought to align the dehabituating,

15 ethical, and personal-growth aspects of artistic practice with other forms of

16 production in culture, particularly by associating the experimental test with

17 scientific practice, advanced technological design, and sociocultural progress.

18 In offering parameters for such a conception of artistic work, by the mid-1940s

19 the neo-Bauhaus model at the College held experimentation to be a practice

20 of changing ingrained habits of perception by testing the contingency of form

21 in controlled situations.

22 By 1948, however, several factors—including logistical ones such as the de-

23 parture or retirement of founding or early-era faculty members; the influx of

24 a pool of less malleable (or sometimes merely anti-Germanic) older students

25 and veterans on GI Bill funding who were attracted by the College’s growing

26 53

27 reputation for its summer art and music programs; and, most pressingly, the

28 arrival of first-generation abstract expressionists such as Franz Kline, Willem

29 de Kooning, and Robert Motherwell—had the effect of reorienting the College

30 from a broader liberal arts basis to a more focused concentration on visual,

31 musical, and literary practices and polemics. Though Josef Albers was keen to

32 invite guest faculty for the summer sessions whose work represented a wide

33 spectrum of contemporary visual and cultural production, in 1948 his facul-

34 ty picks proved to be advocates of persuasive alternative arguments for what

35 artistic experimentation could and should mean in the postwar period. These

36 alternatives would challenge the predominance of Albers’s model of art pro-

37 duction, and throw into question the primacy of his pedagogical style at the

38 College. Indeed, whether they acted intentionally or not, proponents of these

39 other visions for (and sometimes against) experimentation undermined the

40 framework (and I use the word framework pointedly: it was a work of framing

41 aesthetic experience) of the Bauhaus model of attention and careful serial vari-

42 ation erected at the College, forevermore eroding its dominance and, by the

43 1950s, jeopardizing its legitimacy as one of the reigning projects of modernist

44 art production in the United States.

45 The Black Mountain College summer session of 1948 surpassed in popu-

46 larity and scope the vaunted 1946 incarnation that had elicited an influential

47 cover profile about the College in Design magazine.2 Among a rotating group

48 of about twenty faculty in session from July through August 1948 were danc-

49 er-choreographer Merce Cunningham and composer John Cage, visitors to the

50 College earlier that year who were asked back for the summer; artists Willem

51 de Kooning and Richard Lippold, both recommended by Cage; architect R.

52 Buckminster Fuller (whose version of experimentation is the topic of chapter

53 3 of this book), and Beaumont Newhall, previously in residence during the

54 summer of 1946, who returned to teach the history of photography. They were

55 joined by about seventy-five painting, sculpture, and theater students, includ-

56 ing Ruth Asawa, Joseph Fiore, Betty and Peter Jennerhahn, Ray Johnson, Hazel

57 Larsen Archer, Kenneth Noland, Arthur Penn, Kenneth Snelson, and Paul and

58 Vera Williams. The Williamses later provided key financial support to Cage

59 and Cunningham at Black Mountain—Cage’s 1952--53 chance-based audiotape

60 collage work Williams Mix was named for them—and they helped support the

61 Merce Cunningham Dance Company, founded during the troupe’s 1953 sum-

62 mer-in-residence at the College.

63 The first assault on the dominant Bauhaus model was blunt. Soon after de

64 Kooning arrived to teach painting, he sowed seeds of resistance to the notion

65 that studying art was necessary at all. According to his wife, Elaine, who was

66 also on campus that summer, by the end of his time at Black Mountain

6754 chapter two

68PIC

69 Figure 2.1

70Clemens Kalischer, John Cage at Black Mountain College,

71 1948. Gelatin silver print. ľ Clemens Kalischer. Courtesy

72 the artist.

73 Bill had also become deeply involved with his students. Too involved, Albers

74 thought. He said to Bill at the end of the summer, ‘‘You had ten students. Six

75 of them are leaving the College to go to New York City this September. Do

76 you know anything about it?’’ ‘‘Sure,’’ said Bill. ‘‘I told them if they wanted to

77 be artists, they should quit school and come to New York and get a studio and

78 start painting.’’ Albers seemed not to take this amiss. When he was appointed

79 chairman of the Art Department at Yale two years later, Bill was the first artist

80 to be hired to teach there.3

81 It could be expected that the example of the progressive, modernist art school,

82 embodied most famously and perhaps most effectively by the Bauhaus and by

83 John Cage’s ChanCe ProtoCols 55

84 Black Mountain College, would be challenged by de Kooning and other New

85 York school artists (despite their name). The centrality of pedagogy at both in-

86 stitutions—the transmission of ideas through teaching in formalized situations,

87 of visual testing exercises loosely overseen by a master teacher in design-based

88 artistic experiments—would no doubt grate against the libertarian, individual-

89 ist streak of US-based abstract expressionism.4 (Their allied critics, too, would

90 challenge Black Mountain’s pedagogy. Clement Greenberg, recommended to

91 the College faculty by de Kooning, taught there in 1950. Though he credited the

92 students with impressive intensity, he ultimately ‘‘felt that not much art came

93 out of Black Mountain [only some famous names].’’5) The claim that students

94 at the College did not produce ‘‘mature’’ art, or the accusation that education

95 suffocated creative practice by emphasizing technical skills acquired through

96 trial, test, and peirastic dialogue, were historically quite frequent criticisms of

97 higher education and art institutions leveled by expressionist artists.6

98 Albers, however, was prepared for assaults on the Bauhaus-derived

99 Black Mountain curriculum by expressionists such as de Kooning; after

100 all, he’d spent most of his life and work advocating creative explorations of

101 form beyond the habituated constraints of artists’ subjective or self-revela-

102 tory responses. Yet it was the wolf in sheep’s clothing—John Cage’s model

103 of experimentation—for which Albers was ill-equipped. De Kooning, like his

104 fellow expressionists, did not employ the language of experimentation in a

105 rigorously defined manner; as was discussed in this book’s introduction, in

106 several ways expressionism is antithetical to the practice of the test or to the

107 rhetoric of experimentation as a disciplined, systematic process of examining

108 variables subject to thorough controls. Cage, unlike expressionists, arrived at

109 Black Mountain in 1948 with a version of experimentation—a ‘‘marriage of

110 order and freedom,’’ as he phrased it—that he considered very much in line

111 with Albers’s.7 Yet within a few years, the normally collegial Albers would

112 end his friendship with Cage over the issue of the primacy of chance events in

113 explorations considered experimental.

114 Cage’s methodology of chance-based experimentation first emerged in the

115 scores and events he composed when he taught at Black Mountain from 1948

116 through 1953; in many ways the seismic shifts in his practice during this period

117 are tied to his close engagement with the College. In these scores and events,

118 Cage initiated a series of practices that were highly structured, yet paradoxical-

119 ly attempted to sever the performance of a work from intention, argumenta-

120 tion, or ‘‘authorial’’ control. For Cage, the coupling of organized processes with

121 aleatory (chance-generated) results made it possible to transcend predictable

122 habits of composition and recital. How can one understand Cage’s quixotic

123 formulation of experimentation as a ‘‘purpose to remove purposes,’’ so counter-

12456 chapter two intuitive to how an experiment was typically envisioned at Black Mountain?8 To

125 investigate this apparent contradiction in the careful organization of situations

126 of greater contingency, of his use of order to obtain indeterminate outcomes, I

127 propose a seemingly oxymoronic phrase: ‘‘chance protocol.’’

128 To Cage, the test was an exploration of uncertainty, not a careful examina-

129 tion of variables (à la Albers). Two watershed events staged at Black Moun-

130 tain played a decisive role in Cage’s formulation of experimentation in such a

131 manner: first, his 1948 production of composer and poet Erik Satie’s 1913 play

132 The Ruse of Medusa (Le piège de Méduse) and second, his 1952 Theater Piece

133No. 1 (sometimes referred to as Untitled Event), which was subsequently pro-

134 claimed the first ‘‘happening.’’ In Theater Piece No. 1, despite a seemingly chaotic

135 or random form, particular parameters governed the execution of the work:

136 fixed durational segments, the assignment of specific tasks to performers, and

137 an agreed-upon use of certain tools or instruments. This structure served as a

138 chance protocol, allowing ever-greater unpredictability to emerge within pre-

139 defined limitations. In the years that Cage was locked in a tight orbit with the

140 College, his chance-protocol version of experimentation increasingly focused

141 on chance-derived, durationally notated instructions as a means to create and

142 organize contingent events. Initially he used chance processes to compose dis-

143 crete and determinate scores; eventually he developed strategies that allowed a

144 performance to retain as much indeterminacy as possible, usually by producing

145 scores that were subject to alteration before and during recital, and that em-

146 ployed notation systems open to interpretation by the performers.

147 Cage’s pioneering of new forms of composition and performance developed

148 in a climate receptive to seeing experimentation as not merely a feature of visual

149 art practices but also of time-based events and interdisciplinary collaborations.

150 In fact, Black Mountain was one of the rare outposts in the United States during

151 this period for in-depth work in experimental performance—that is to say, pro-

152 ductions coming out of a background in the visual arts that emphasized impro-

153 visational workshopping or unrehearsed performances, nonnarrative methods

154 (in other words, unscripted events lacking developed characterization or dra-

155 matic arc), and a close consideration of how to demarcate or collapse the spaces

156 of performance and audience. Specifically, during the 1930s the College was

157 the key US site invested in a ‘‘Bauhaus idea’’ of theater and live performance.

158 This was due to the popularity of Bauhaus-influenced theater at the campus:

159 throughout the mid-1930s, Bauhaus theater master Oskar Schlemmer’s pupil

160 and collaborator Xanti Schawinsky had staged several original productions

161 of nonnarrative, participatory theater at the College, including Spectodrama:

162 Play, Life, Illusion in 1936 and Danse Macabre: A Sociological Study in 1938. In

163 his project of experimentation through careful observation, it is no coincidence

164 John Cage’s ChanCe ProtoCols 57

165 that Schawinsky subsequently spent several years at ‘‘Albersian’’ Black Moun-

166 tain further developing interdisciplinary theatrical models initially explored in

167 Weimar and Dessau.9

168 The first section of this chapter will explore the existing tradition of Bauhaus

169 experimental theater at Black Mountain, which would be challenged by Cage.

170 Though ten years separated Schawinsky’s departure from Cage’s first extended

171 visit, the models these men investigated and developed at the College represent

172 two of the most radical explorations of US-based experimental performance

173 taking place between the wars and after. (A third, I would argue, was Bertolt

174 Brecht’s notion of Verfremdungseffekts [‘‘distancing effects’’] and Lehrstück

175 [‘‘learning through participation’’] in his ‘‘Epic Theater,’’ which also found fer-

176 tile ground at Black Mountain: Brecht’s English translator Eric Bentley taught

177 there for several years in the mid-1940s and staged productions of Brecht, in-

178 cluding a 1944 reading with sound effects and music of The Private Life of the

179Master Race.10) Stage events at Black Mountain had also adventurously sampled

180 other European precursors beyond Bauhaus performance—for example, poet

181 M. C. Richards’s productions of works by Jean Cocteau, including Knights of

182the Round Table in 1949 and a theater-in-the-round version of Marriage on the

183Eiffel Tower in 1950 (fig. 2.2). It is in Schawinsky’s work, though, that we see

184 a model of nonnarrative performance most clearly related though opposed to

185 that which Cage came to embrace. By staging a comparison between these two

186 models, the stakes of experiments in theater and other time-based media and

187 events in the postwar period can begin to be elucidated. As we will see, the

188 approaches to experimental performance Cage developed at the College soon

189 rose to prominence (and a great deal of notoriety), overshadowing the Bauhaus

190 model, which remains largely obscured to this day.11

191 The second part of this chapter will address how the ‘‘French’’ influences

192 Cage introduced were, in actuality, a series of hybrid sources he was working

193 through in the five years he taught at Black Mountain.12 In this period, he joined

194 several seemingly incompatible threads—French modernist theater from be-

195 fore and after World War I; Zen Buddhism (his fascination with the mystic

196 Huang Po’s strain of Zen arose during his time at the College); and Dada-sur-

197 realist employments of chance composition, most centrally those of Antonin

198 Artaud and Marcel Duchamp.13 His explorations of dispersion, disorder, and

199 void-like mindlessness came to spurn purposeful communication between per-

200 former and audience, estranged the traditional, ‘‘scored’’ relationship between

201 a composition and its performance, and began to draw on aleatory systems that

202 paradoxically structured and controlled unexpected results beyond human pre-

203 diction. The importance of Cage’s practical and discursive move to the chance

204 protocol is key to understanding the epistemic shift involved in repositioning

20558 chapter two

206PIC

207 Figure 2.2

208Hazel Larsen Archer, June Rice Christensen as the Photographer

209 in Jean Cocteau’s ‘‘Marriage on the Eiffel Tower,’’ Black Mountain

210 College, 1950. Courtesy of the Estate of Hazel Larsen Archer and

211 the Black Mountain College Museum + Arts Center.

212 experimentation as the production of events that were indeterminate as to their

213 performance. In this, Cage’s Black Mountain events radically altered the spec-

214 trum of possibility for art and performance: in his explorations of French-de-

215 rived avant-garde theater, first of Satie’s work and subsequently of Artaud’s and

216 Duchamp’s, he inaugurated a new experimental model that came to define not

217 only Black Mountain’s future but the trajectories of Fluxus performance, Allan

218 Kaprow--esque Happenings, Judson Dance Theater, and numerous other 1950s

219 and 1960s events.

220 The third and final section of this chapter will take up how in Theater Piece

221No. 1 Cage pushed experimental performance even further than his sources.

222 Coupled with his analyses of Po’s, Artaud’s, and Duchamp’s projects, Cage’s

223 admiration for Robert Rauschenberg’s Black Mountain College--era works,

224 particularly his 1951 White Paintings, helped Cage explore experimentation as

225 a tool to ‘‘unfocus attention’’14 (fig. 2.3). The apparent emptiness of Rauschen-

226 berg’s paintings encouraged him to ‘‘check my habits of seeing, to counter them

227 for the sake of greater freshness …to be unfamiliar with what I’m doing.’’15 Ul-

228 timately, Cage felt that Rauschenberg’s work revealed that ‘‘art is the imitation

229 of nature in her manner of operation,’’ operations that Cage believed could be

230 unburdened of human desire and interference. He believed his model of stag-

231 ing inattention and dispersion exposed art’s pretentions to ordering life, better

232 reflecting nature’s own complexity, chancy-ness, and lack of single purpose.16

233 John Cage’s ChanCe ProtoCols 59

234PIC

235 Figure 2.3

236 Robert Rauschenberg, White Painting, 1951. House paint

237 on canvas, 72 Œ 72, four panels. ľ Robert Rauschenberg

238 Foundation/Licensed by VAGA, New York, NY.

239 His perspective on chance operations as a mirror to the (dis)order of nature has

240 proved a contentious point for artists and scholars, from Josef Albers to many

241 in the present. As this last section considers, Cage’s sense of the experimental

242 chance protocol as handmaiden to anarchical freedom from sociopolitical de-

243 terminants remains controversial.

244 In advocating notions of multisensory presentness and the diffusion of at-

245 tention, Cage understood his work as exceeding the Bauhaus tradition at Black

246 Mountain, replacing it instead with studies in Dadaist chance and simultaneity,

247 as well as events inspired by Po’s and Artaud’s conceptions of void-like expe-

248 riences. In his proposal of a chance protocol, Cage argued that a new dimen-

249 sion of perception could be revealed outside human faculties of organization

250 and intention, a form of dispassionate quiescence he paradoxically spent most

251 of his life actively scripting. In order to understand the stakes of the chance

252 protocol’s contravention of the Albersian model of experimentation as tests

25360 chapter two of controlled variables, we must therefore return to the origin of that tradition

254 in performance—Bauhaus theater—and the genesis of the break—Erik Satie’s

255 The Ruse of Medusa.

256 ÉpatEr lE bauhaus

257 Cage first arrived at Black Mountain College in April 1948 without a teach-

258 ing commision: he was Cunningham’s piano accompanist. But that was still

259 a position of some visibility. In addition to theater and art, Black Mountain

260 throughout the 1930s and 1940s was a notable outpost of experimental music;

261 in 1944, for instance, it hosted a well-publicized and internationally renowned

262 conference celebrating Arnold Schoenberg’s seventy-fifth birthday.17 As early

263 as the late 1930s, when Cage was on the West Coast, he had heard rumors of

264 Black Mountain as ‘‘an advanced place,’’ and had written the school asking for

265 a job; in 1942 he propositioned that the College found an on-site Center for

266 Experimental Music.18 Neither proposal panned out. By the late 1940s, Cage

267 was facing resistance to his work as a composer, though not as a rather showy

268 performer of his prepared piano compositions, performances in which he in-

269 serted objects between piano strings and played the instrument largely for its

270 percussive qualities. He was therefore ‘‘delighted’’ when Albers offered him a

271 teaching post at the College—his first for music composition—during the up-

272 coming summer session of 1948.19

273 When Cage assumed his teaching responsibilities at the College, he further

274 shifted his compositional strategy from the systemic explorations of atonali-

275 ty, seriality, and other recent developments in musical composition that Black

276 Mountain’s Schoenberg-oriented tradition was associated with. That summer,

277 he brought with him nearly all eighteen extant musical scores by Erik Satie and

278 a copy of Satie’s only play, The Ruse of Medusa, proposing the College host an

279 ‘‘amateur festival’’ of Satie’s music. He proceeded to antagonize many of the Col-

280 lege’s German émigrés by performing Satie’s oeuvre exclusively throughout his

281 summer-long stay, rather than surveying, as he remembered it, ‘‘modern music

282 in general’’; particularly infuriating was one of Cage’s introductory speeches

283 that denounced Beethoven’s harmonic tradition in favor of Satie’s emphasis on

284 rhythm and duration.20 In contrast to the rancor his lecture stirred, Cage’s pro-

285 duction of Satie’s long-neglected The Ruse of Medusa, translated that summer by

286 Richards, was universally admired (fig. 2.4). Student Arthur Penn (later known

287 for his films The Miracle Worker and Bonnie and Clyde) directed Buckminster

288 Fuller as the Baron Medusa, Elaine de Kooning as his daughter Frisette, and

289 John Cage’s ChanCe ProtoCols 61

290PIC

291 Figure 2.4 (above) Figure 2.5 (below)

292PIC

293Clemens Kalischer, Cast Portrait of ‘‘The Ruse of Medusa,’’ Clemens Kalischer, Buckminster Fuller and Merce including John Cage, Elaine de Kooning, Buckminster Cunningham in ‘‘The Ruse of Medusa,’’ 1948. Gelatin silver

294Fuller, and Merce Cunningham, 1948. Gelatin silver print. print. ľ Clemens Kalischer. Courtesy the artist. ľ Clemens Kalischer. Courtesy the artist.

295 Cunningham as Jonas the ‘‘costly mechanical monkey,’’ with sets and props by

296 Fuller, Willem and Elaine de Kooning, and students Ruth Asawa, Ray John-

297 son, and others. The props included a velvet footstool with giant human feet, a

298 monumental thermometer capped by an oversized paper bow, and a ‘‘baron’s

299 desk’’ painted in a ‘‘guild secret’’ trompe l’oeil technique de Kooning said he had

300 learned as teenager in Holland; this was outfitted with enormous four-sided

301 triangles around its legs (a tweak on the importance of tetrahedrons in Fuller’s

302 work)21 (fig. 2.5).

303 The production set the groundwork for a renewed exploration of the Col-

304 lege’s experimental theater tradition that had remained mostly dormant since

305 Schawinsky’s departure in 1938. Satie’s play features an eccentric, doddering

306 aristocrat, his insolent and ever-defiant manservant, an obedient daughter,

307 and her terrified straight-man fiancé. Consisting largely of rapid-fire puns and

308 absurd nonsequiturs, the loosely sketched plot follows the Baron’s attempts to

309 wire one General Posthumous, a storyline designed as an excuse to frame the

310 Baron’s nonsensical pronouncements regarding the impending betrothal of his

311 daughter. Scene changes are marked by short musical interludes danced by the

312 mechanical monkey, written in a musical notation full of wisecracks and ironic

313 comments (fig. 2.6). In one section, for example, the score’s text reads at bottom,

314 ‘‘Instructions in Roman text are for the choreographer, in italic for the pianist’’;

315 these begin with the following comments: ‘‘The Monkey’s Dance, no. 1; Qua-

316drille The monkey dances, sweetly, the following figure; put yourself in the shade;

317 He goes crazy, or it looks as if he has; Do not come out of your shadow / Behave

318 yourself, please: a monkey is watching you; The dance can end here.’’22

319 Satie’s ‘‘lyrical comedy in one act’’ was rarely performed, though it was

320 considered an important successor to Alfred Jarry’s play Ubu Roi (1896) in a

321 tradition of absurdist theater. Satie’s emphasis on burlesque gestures and his

322 creation of characters that sputtered childlike nonsense—‘‘five plus three makes

323 eleven …take four leaves six …two plus seven makes eighteen,’’ or, a few lines

324 later, ‘‘I am going to a billiards match. What a great match! Napoleon will be

325 there. The billiards Napoleon, I mean of course! …the real one’’—made

326 the entire production seem a farcical romp.23 In an article Cage later penned

327 on Satie, he pointed to the apparent freewheeling, illogical unpredictability of

328 Satie’s work and its disregard of musical seriousness as being its most compel-

329 ling qualities. In the essay, set up as an imaginary conversation between the two

330 men sourced from Satie’s published statements, Cage quoted the composer:

331 They will tell you I am not a musician. That’s right. …Take the Fils des Etoiles

332or the Morceaux en forme de poire, En habit de cheval or the Sarabandes, it is

333 clear that no musical idea presided at the creation of these works.24

334 John Cage’s ChanCe ProtoCols 63

335PIC

336 Figure 2.6

337 Erik Satie, ‘‘The Monkey’s Dance (no. 1).’’ From The Ruse

338 of Medusa, 1913.

339 The flippancy with which Satie dismissed musical intention delighted Cage. He

340 concluded his ‘‘conversation’’ with the kan that ‘‘to be interested in Satie one

341 must be disinterested to begin with,’’ a paradox of non-intentioned intention

342 Cage often returned to in defining his chance protocol.25

343 Yet earlier in the essay, Cage claimed that Satie’s investment (far from disin-

344 terestedness) in antagonizing or shocking his audience—the ‘‘power to irritate’’

345 expressed in Satie’s call to ‘‘despise art’’—inspired Cage’s staging of the play at

346 Black Mountain.26 In particular, he was compelled by Satie’s attempt to make

34764 chapter two ‘‘unpredictable’’ music that, in Satie’s words, ‘‘will be part of the noises of the

348 environment.’’27 Satie’s works demonstrated that music composition could re-

349 flect everyday events—not ‘‘musical ideas’’—by representing ambient noises

350 such as the sounds of eating or the pauses between conversations. To Satie,

351 the radical neutrality of a sound not imposing itself on its audience as ‘‘music’’

352 fundamentally leveled hierarchies of distinction and quality; to Cage, such a

353 move let ‘‘sounds be just sounds …just folk tunes, unresolved ninths, or knives

354 and forks.’’28 In studying Satie’s other scores—particularly Vexations (1893), a

355 cycle that can extend to nearly 24 hours in performance, based on 840 repeti-

356 tions of a simple, fifty-two-beat theme whose four arrangements are alternately

357 heard unaccompanied and then played with two variations of a short chord

358 sequence—Cage was enthusiastic about Satie’s concern with the durational

359 aspects of sound.29 In contrast to more complex qualities of aural information

360 (pitch, frequency, amplitude, and so on), duration was the only feature that was

361 unspecific: it could incorporate measures of both silence and the audible. The

362 grand length of a performance of Vexations—a length that exceeded nearly any

363 individual’s ability to listen attentively—satisfied Satie’s desire that his work be

364 ‘‘furniture music’’ intended as background for other events. By stressing the

365 durational aspect of sound over musical tone, in opposition to prior harmonic

366 traditions, Cage argued that Satie accepted when ‘‘a sound is a sound …[one

367 can] give up illusions about ideas of order, expressions of sentiment, and all

368 the rest of our inherited aesthetic claptrap.’’30 Important, too, was The Ruse of

369Medusa’s occasional use of instructions to the performer in durational—not

370 musically notated—segments of simple time structures designated in cardinal

371 numbers and plain language (this feature reemerged in Cage’s own work during

372 his next visit to Black Mountain in 1952).

373 Like several College productions before it, Cage’s staging of The Ruse of

374Medusa encouraged intentionally unnaturalistic and stylized acting as well as

375 innovative set and costume design. Yet there were important differences. Cage’s

376 sourcing of Satie as a precedent for a theater of cacophonous simultaneity and

377 jest departed considerably from existing Bauhaus-oriented theater and perfor-

378 mance that found its way to the College, though these were as dedicated to

379 changing audience’s perceptions through trained visual attention and concen-

380 tration as Satie’s was to doing so with fragmentary, incommunicable meanings

381 and ambiguous gestures.

382 By the mid-1920s, an entire pedagogical and practice methodology dedicat-

383 ed to workshopping time- and motion-based compositions had been perfected

384 at the Bauhaus in its second home in Dessau. This had not always been the case:

385 early theater productions, under the direction of artist Lothar Schreyer, had

386 been expressionistic and melodramatic, with highly charged emotional con-

387 John Cage’s ChanCe ProtoCols 65

388PIC

389 Figure 2.7

390 Oskar Schlemmer, Triadic Ballet, 1922, photograph 1925.

391 Courtesy Oskar Schlemmer Theatre Estate and Collection.

392 Photograph ľ Estate of Karl Grill. Reproduced by permission

393 of The J. Paul Getty Museum, Los Angeles.

394 tent underscored by dramatic lighting and costumes. In contrast, when Oskar

395 Schlemmer arrived at the Bauhaus in 1921 and subsequently assumed director-

396 ship of the stage workshop in 1923, he explicitly linked theatrical performance

397 with the periodic festivals and costume parties hosted by the school. The em-

398 phasis, for Schlemmer, was not on festivity per se, but rather on the manner

399 in which the masquerade of such events disguised and transformed the human

400 body. He began staging masque-like shows in which performers’ features were

401 camouflaged by heavily padded costumes, elaborate papier-mâché masks, and

402 helmetlike headdresses. In doing so, performers’ bodies were extracted from

403 ‘‘natural’’ or everyday experiences in order to be turned into archetypes of ge-

404 ometry and movement31 (fig. 2.7).

405 Actors in Schlemmer’s productions employed broad, pantomimic gestures

406 and generally did not speak. For example, in Gesture Dance (1926), three per-

407 formers wearing bulbous metallic masks outfitted with identical mustaches

40866 chapter two and spectacles execute flamboyant renditions of ‘‘everyday actions’’ including

409 sneezing, laughing, and listening.32 The characters’ gesticulations are exagger-

410 ated to the point of being stilted, and the figures return to certain tropes of

411 communication: hand cupped to ear indicates listening, palm shading mouth

412 signs whispering, and boisterous rocking back and forth suggests laughter. The

413 stylized gestures, combined with the use of masks and cumbersome costumes,

414 disengaged the performing body from its habitual movements.

415 The emphasis on costume in Bauhaus theater also transfigured the human

416 body and its everyday appearance by removing distinguishing characteristics

417 and imposing an order of simple shapes and primary colors. According to

418 Schlemmer, this abstracted the body and generalized its features in order to

419 ‘‘reduce the differentiated parts …to simple, unifying forms.’’33 These unified

420 forms thereby permitted viewers to see ‘‘new totality’’ beyond previous hab-

421 it-driven and subjective understandings of form.34 In most theatrical perfor-

422 mance, and indeed in most everyday social behavior, subtle work of visual dis-

423 crimination routinely helps to organize, categorize, and ultimately hierarchize

424 relatively minor differences in human appearances; for example, assessments

425 of the size of a nose or the contour of a foot become paramount indicators of

426 beauty or grace. In stressing general forms, Schlemmer rejected the meticulous

427 morphologies of fashion, the superficial interpretations of physiognomic varia-

428 tion, or the cultural conditioning that patterned gesture and exploited arbitrary

429 differences to create regimes of infinitesimal judgment and distinction. As these

430PIC

431 Figure 2.8

432 Oskar Schlemmer, drawing of Man as Dancer from

433Man and Art Figure, ca. 1921. Courtesy Oskar Schlemmer

434 Theatre Estate and Collection.

435 John Cage’s ChanCe ProtoCols 67

436 historically specific, though relatively arbitrary, characteristics became natu-

437 ralized, Schlemmer contended, they promoted fetishistic judgments regard-

438 ing minute differences of form as compared with other fundamentally similar

439 forms. In contrast, Bauhaus theater attempted to overturn this tradition of tiny

440 visual distinctions made according to socially determined, often conflicting

441 habits. It did so by heightening the artifice onstage so that rationally discerned

442 details would throw habitual patterns into sharp relief. In Schlemmer’s system,

443 this perspicuous work of visual judgment focused on the close observation of

444 the relationship of bodies—not as compared to themselves, but rather seen as

445 embedded in larger perspectival contexts and environments. Reducing theater

446 to such basic design elements as form and color represented ‘‘an undertaking

447 whose purpose, contrary to nature, is order.’’35 Denaturalizing the actors’ move-

448 ments and costumes encouraged spectators to remain self-conscious about the

449 spatial relations surrounding the bodies onstage, estranging from habit their

450 perceptions of, and judgments about, human form and gesture.

451 In contrast to Cage’s emphasis on arbitrariness, distraction, and discon-

452 nection, the keywords of Bauhaus theater were unity, totality, and order. For

453 Schlemmer, ‘‘unity’’ was an escape from the maddening simplification of life

454 into trivial and fragmentary subcategories that effaced the larger interconnect-

455 edness of bodies, spatial contexts, and habits of social behavior. With concen-

456 tration and attention, broader concerns could be assessed and judged, includ-

457 ing the fundamental features of form (light, color, movement, and so on) that

458 constituted the foundation of all perception. In the stripped-down environment

459 of the new, ‘‘total’’ stage, spectators would be able to notice how the framing of a

460 theatrical space marked conventions in everyday life to which they had become

461 oblivious and conditioned.

462 In 1936, Albers invited the Swiss émigré Xanti Schawinsky, who had studied

463 with Schlemmer from 1924 to 1928, to Black Mountain to teach painting and

464 theater.36 After fleeing persecution in Nazi Germany, Schawinsky had immi-

465 grated to Italy and had spent several years working in advertising for companies

466 such as Illy Caff’e, Cinzano vermouth, and Olivetti typewriters. He was best

467 known for producing a widely circulated photomontage poster of Mussolini

468 as the head of the masses to celebrate the twelfth anniversary of the Fascist

469 revolution. (Schawinsky was an equal-opportunity designer, one could say:

470 after leaving Black Mountain, he taught at the New Bauhaus in Chicago and

471 with László Moholy-Nagy created patterns for a US Army project of equipment

472 camouflage.)37

473 When he landed at the College, Schawinsky became the United States’ sole

474 proponent and performer of Bauhaus theater, and his ideas and productions re-

475 mained very much part of the institutional memory and lore of the campus after

47668 chapter two

477PIC

478 Figure 2.9

479Xanti Schawinsky, Spectodrama: Play, Life, Illusion, 1936--37.

480 From Helen Post Black Mountain College Documentary Photo

481 Collection. Reproduced courtesy of Peter Modley.

482 his departure; later these were widely circulated in his published reminiscences

483 about his time at Black Mountain.38 Within months of his arrival, he organized

484 a production of nonnarrative theater—a theater of what he called ‘‘total expe-

485 rience’’—titled Spectodrama: Play, Life, Illusion, with music by Kurt Schwitters

486 (his Ursonate [1922--32]) (see plates 10--12). In a series of episodes that had been

487 previously ‘‘storyboarded’’ and rehearsed through improvisational techniques,

488Spectodrama staged short scenes of selected elementary concepts of theater,

489 each falling into a specific category: ‘‘optics, form and color, acoustics, sound,

490 language, music, time, space, architecture, technology, and illusion.’’39

491 In each vignette of Spectodrama, the performer’s body, if evident at all

492 (camouflage and illusion, and their constitutive elements of high-contrast

493 John Cage’s ChanCe ProtoCols 69

494 geometric forms, were key features of the Bauhaus style), figures in a tab-

495 leau of what Schawinsky termed ‘‘archetypal’’ geometric, spatial, or social

496 situations: ‘‘play,’’ ‘‘communication,’’ ‘‘form,’’ or ‘‘space.’’ Each portion of the

497 play contains elaborate sets and costumes designed so as to either conceal or

498 set off the performer’s placement and orientation with respect to the stage

499 space and props. For example, one performer, trussed in a costume of stiff,

500 intertwined white paper rolls, might emerge chameleonlike from a tangle

501 of similarly twisted paper props and move toward the stark relief of a blank

502 background. The figure’s poses and the patterns of the props repeat through-

503 out the space to create a ‘‘laboratory for demonstration’’ of the conditions of

504 perceiving difference and similarity.40

505 Moholy-Nagy, also a key figure in Bauhaus theater, termed this research-like

506 element of rational attention the ‘‘theater of totality,’’ in which a body’s move-

507 ment transpired in a structured, architectonic space.41 Rigorously ordering

508 bodies in the theater demonstrated a kind of technical competence that, in

509 orchestrating complex spatial relations onstage, extended the project of spatial

510 organization into nontheatrical everyday life (the theater being a microcosmic

511 exploration of the larger Bauhaus project of synthesizing the ‘‘living and work-

512 ing conditions of the environment’’).42 Though spectators were seated and their

513 attention carefully organized, ‘‘dynamism’’ in performance was nonetheless a

514 frequently invoked term: kinetic sculptures and moving bodies were deployed

515 in order to show that, to Moholy-Nagy, ‘‘material is employed only as the carrier

516 of forces.’’43 These forces charged the performance space with a temporal com-

517 ponent that expressed the true ‘‘unity of life.’’44 In contrast to architecture, static

518 sculpture, or painting, theater was the arena for an examination of transient,

519 time-based events and movements intersecting environmental conditions, and

520 the body’s temporal engagement with those sociospatial circumstances.

521 The search for universal gestures ‘‘common to mankind’’ took precedence

522 over what Moholy-Nagy termed the ‘‘causal ties’’ of previous theater.45 Stage

523 design was emphasized, forcing ‘‘one to learn from the way an artist perceives’’

524 by estranging viewers’ traditional emphasis on character and narrative in order

525 to instead fabricate complicated illusions of spatial perception.46 This model

526 of integration—the performing body and space joined in an ‘‘indissoluble uni-

527 ty’’—radically simplified performance to its ‘‘fundamental’’ components: ‘‘light,

528 space, plane, movement, sound, and human being.’’47

529 Walter Gropius, too, was involved in theorizing performance strategies

530 at the Bauhaus, and he underscored how spectatorial conditions of illusion

531 and attention were influenced by the architecture of the theater itself. In the

532 mid-1920s, he proposed a ‘‘Total Theater’’ in which ‘‘new interpretations

533 of theatrical space’’ were to be explored.48 In Gropius’s model, an elliptical

53470 chapter two

535PIC

536 Figure 2.10

537 Walter Gropius, Photoboard with model, isometric with three

538 diagrams showing uses of the stage in the ‘‘Total Theater,’’ 1927.

539 Courtesy Bauhaus-Archiv, Berlin. ľ Artists Rights Society,

540 New York / VG Bild-Kunst, Bonn. Reproduced by permission of

541 Bauhaus-Archiv, Berlin.

542 arrangement of ascending seats was clustered around an embedded, cen-

543 tral circular stage flanking a second cylindrical back stage49 (fig. 2.10). The

544 inner circular stage was designed to rotate, accommodating various seating

545 arrangements that represented the major performance traditions—the pro-

546 scenium stage with a shallow performance space and fixed backdrop, the

547 deep stage in which curtains and backdrops are arranged to reveal greater

548 or lesser portions of the action and to accommodate more or fewer perform-

549 ers, and finally a theater-in-the-round setup. In the latter scenario, according

550 to Gropius, ‘‘the play unfolds itself three-dimensionally while the spectators

551 crowd around concentrically.’’50 He connected this spectatorial arrangement,

552 as Schawinsky did, to precedents in other public, collective events such as the

553 circus, the bullring, and the sports arena.

554 Gropius’s three staging possibilities in the ‘‘Total Theater’’ engendered var-

555 ious spatial effects; more important, his flexible architecture (the rotating core

556 of the structure) could transform the space during performance, surprising the

557 John Cage’s ChanCe ProtoCols 71

558 audience and impelling it to ‘‘shake off its inertia.’’51 The dynamic possibility of

559 moving the stage structure itself intensified the audience’s awareness of the con-

560 ditions of staging, and when the theater was arranged with a central platform

561 surrounded by seating, the ‘‘spectator participate[s] in the drama.’’52 In Bauhaus

562 theories of spectatorship, in other words, the implied salutary social effects of

563 heightening consciousness of the environment were part of the larger interest in

564 concentration, focus, and order as transformative elements of vision. The actor,

565 according to Schlemmer, was ‘‘space-bewitched’’—‘‘altered, transformed, or

566 entranced’’ by the use of masks, props, and costumes so that ‘‘his habitual be-

567 havior and his physical and psychic structure are either upset or put into a new

568 and altogether different balance.’’53 This change in the actor’s ingrained relation

569 to gesture and its social intelligibility would impel an ‘‘inner transformation of

570 the spectator’’ by his or her ‘‘receptivity’’ to the visual ordering of the theatrical

571 field in performance.54 Only a self-reflexive spectator could, ‘‘on the basis of the

572 rational,’’ understand the embeddedness of the actor in his or her surrounding

573 space, a space that is itself ‘‘part of the larger total complex, building (Bau).’’55

574 As the performer acted out order in such a space, the spectator could rationally

575 perceive the larger field of spatial and architectural illusions in which bodies are

576 rooted contextually in their environments.

577 That this work of unification was enacted in the realm of time-based events

578 was important to Schawinsky as he brought these ideas to Black Mountain; to

579 him, theater explored the fundamental conditions of perception underlying all

580 specific disciplinary explorations. As he wrote of theater’s interdisciplinary na-

581 ture, ‘‘Our theater can, I believe, get its impulse from studies that go through all

582 phases of knowledge.’’56 In Schawinsky’s next major performance at the College,

583 he attempted to push notions of spatial totality further. In the 1938 production

584Danse Macabre: A Sociological Study, adapted from a Latin hymn about the

585 Last Judgment called Dies Irae, Schawinsky’s theatrical staging—while still em-

586 phasizing elaborate masks and costumes modeled on abstract shapes, and em-

587 ploying dramatic spotlights and shadows—also included repetitive movements

588 associated with funeral rites as well as highly mannered costuming (figs. 2.11

589 and 2.12). In staging a medieval morality tale, he chose the Middle Ages’ ‘‘single

590 absolute concept: death’’ in an attempt to ‘‘find the ‘absolute’ of our own time.’’57

591 He sought the limiting experience that transcended performance/animation

592 and background/stasis dichotomies—mortality—though he later distanced

593 himself from the direct reenactment of the macabre source material blamed for

594 the suicide of one of its student actors. The theater-in-the-round aspect of the

595 performance, in which spectators were outfitted with robes and masks and giv-

596 en unconventional seating assignments in concentric circles around the central

597 stage area, to him mimicked the ‘‘original plays [of the Middle Ages] which were

59872 chapter two

599PIC

600Figures 2.11 (above) and 2.12 (below)

601PIC

602Xanti Schawinsky, Danse Macabre: A Sociological Study, Black

603 Mountain College, 1938. Courtesy of The Xanti Schawinsky

604 Estate. Reproduced by permission of Bauhaus-Archiv, Berlin.

605 usually performed on the market place in front of the cathedral.’’58 To Schawin-

606 sky, this focus on people and spaces outside traditional theater—for example,

607 individuals in public space—updated Bauhaus precedents that focused on the

608 circus and moved theater into the territory of history by studying constructions

609 of social subjectivity. As he recalled, ‘‘While work at the Bauhaus theatre aimed

610 at the modernization of theatrical means and concepts, and had a definite pro-

611 fessional and artistic scope, at Black Mountain College an educational crack at

612 the whole man seemed in order.’’59

613 What Schawinsky meant by such a ‘‘total experience’’ incorporating the

614 ‘‘whole man’’ can be understood in relation to Schlemmer’s explication of

615 Bauhaus theater as a totality: to both men, the stage was a site of spatial unity

616 that provided, according to Schawinsky, ‘‘a general study of fundamental phe-

617 nomena.’’60 He added that theater was the most appropriate location to explore

618 concepts of basic perception, because ‘‘space on the stage was a very particular

619 place …it is by nature a place of illusion.’’61 Indeed, to Schlemmer, too, move-

620 ments of bodies on the stage represented, by simplification and abstraction, the

621 wider geometries of relationships in space perceived through visual illusion,

622 and its inverse, penetrating observation. Bauhaus theater’s work with perspec-

623 tive, with embedding the body in its space through complicated geometric for-

624 mations, was often presented as a visual tableau in which the audience perceives

625 space, but does not have any direct relation to the performer’s experience of

626 space. This results in the somewhat disembodied eye that the performances ef-

627 fect—why, for example, reproductions of Bauhaus performances look remark-

628 ably like friezes and pictures, or why Schawinsky envisioned the preparatory

629 diagrams of Spectodrama as static tableaus (plates 10--12). The abstraction of

630 Bauhaus theater and its exploration of visual illusions were ‘‘unified,’’ to use

631 Schlemmer’s language, only by the audience’s visually tracking the position(s)

632 of the performer(s); Bauhaus and Bauhaus-derived theater expressly did not

633 create cohesive spaces of unity between performers and spectators, and consis-

634 tently maintained the illusion of the ‘‘fourth wall,’’ even when seating arrange-

635 ments were less frontally oriented.

636 These theatrical scenarios required spectators’ orientation to the staged

637 events to be fixed and their attention carefully focused in order to perceive

638 the precise and subtly changing visual effects on the stage. An immobilized

639 audience permitted Schlemmer and Schawinsky to apply the framing tech-

640 niques of cinema to live performances. With such focused looking, a montage

641 of visual effects could unfold, in order for each spectator to observe phenom-

642 ena with close attention to the order and sequencing of events that he or she

643 would not normally notice if watching as a casual bystander. Though a ‘‘play

644 instinct’’ was encouraged of actors in workshopping, the final productions

64574 chapter two

646PIC

647 Figure 2.13

648 Oskar Schlemmer, drawing from Man and Art Figure, ca. 1921.

649 Courtesy Oskar Schlemmer Theatre Estate and Collection.

650 were predicated on passive spectatorship; Schlemmer wrote that the elabo-

651 rate visual fabulations encouraged a concentration that rivaled the intensity

652 of a ‘‘peep show’’62 (fig. 2.13).

653 In important ways, Schawinsky’s work can be seen as a proxy, in time-based

654 work, for what Albers’s sensibilities hoped to accomplish in two dimensions.

655 Much like Albers, Schawinsky promoted a model of experimentation that

656 stressed order, concentration, and serial repetition, and employed careful vari-

657 ations of formal elements—color, gesture, costume, set design, and lighting—

658 that could be measured, compared, and repeated. These tests of perception

659 were undertaken to dynamically reappraise the seemingly self-evident nature

660 of vision, and to question the habit-driven tendency of physical gestures to

661 be reproduced unwittingly. The experimental practices of both Schawinsky

662 and Albers can be seen as but a corner of a larger Bauhaus project demanding

663 that the experimental act of perceptual testing produce dynamic outcomes in

664 a serial practice of repeatable trials. Schawinsky’s performances were part of a

665 collective project at the Bauhaus in which all forms of perception were being

666 reconsidered, those of time, space, and theatricality, too; for these reasons, the

667 Bauhaus was the first art school to formally incorporate a performance depart-

668 ment, then called a ‘‘stage workshop,’’ into its curriculum. Just as Oskar Schlem-

669 mer envisioned his project as a ‘‘laboratory’’ exploration of space—isolating

670 constitutive elements of light, color, and movement to attend to how under-

671 lying patterns and arrangements of forms outside the theater might function,

672 John Cage’s ChanCe ProtoCols 75

673PIC

674 Figure 2.14

675 Xanti Schawinsky, scene from The Circus, first performance at

676 the Bauhaus, 1924. Courtesy of The Xanti Schawinsky Estate.

677 Schawinsky pushed Albers’s ideas of laboratory production toward concerns

678 of duration, sound, and motion; toward the incorporation of bodies, theatrical

679 audience, and three-dimensional space—concerns that have always been more

680 pressing in theater than in visual art.63

681 Cage’s production of The Ruse of Medusa was also a hybrid site of theater in a

682 visual arts context, yet Erik Satie’s script, in contrast to the Bauhaus precedents

683 at the College, was dialogue-heavy and intentionally humorous, with quips ad-

684 dressed to the audience explicitly breaking down the fourth wall and engaging

685 the spectator at a supravisual level. In Bauhaus productions from the 1920s,

686 Schawinsky in particular often included comedic scenarios, particularly around

687 the figure of the clown in circus theatrics, but they were largely explorations

688 of pantomime: gesture in relation to the forms of props and the space of the

689 stage (fig. 2.14). The emphasis in the Satie play on a script to be verbalized by

690 actors characterizing fictionalized yet archly comedic roles also departed from

691 Black Mountain precedents. Satie’s 1913 script was, distinct from Bauhaus circus

692 antics and pantomime, a proto--Marx Brothers slapstick full of ribald verbal

693 repartee interspersed with burlesque-like visual gags—scene 2 ends with Baron

694 Medusa, sounding very much like Groucho twenty years later, telling Frisette’s

695 fiancé Astolfo: ‘‘Get out now! …Off like a gun! …Come back in ten minutes . . .

696 I shan’t be here.’’64

697 The provocations of The Ruse of Medusa—its silly jesting and the disrup-

698 tion of narrative continuity in the play’s sarcastic commentary (as Satie himself

699 stated, ‘‘This is a play of pure fantasy …a joke’’)—were only part of its allure

700 for Cage.65 More important, the work was part of a Dadaist repertoire char-

701 acterized by a particular style of writing and scoring. According to historian

70276 chapter two Sandra Skurvida, Cage’s fascination with the play stemmed from how ‘‘Satie

703 introduced incongruence between language (musical, visual, notational, etc.)

704 and meaning.’’66 Satie’s score and script become a fused and highly interpre-

705 table object pointing to a fundamental hybridity between aural and written

706 information—The Ruse of Medusa’s musical score contains nearly as much tex-

707 tual as sound notation, and its script includes musical interludes interrupting

708 the narrative (such as it is) with a nonverbal ‘‘Monkey’s Dance’’ that is never

709 clearly connected to the other events of the play. Performers must translate

710 both forms of information, which, due to Satie’s nonsensical asides, exceed the

711 normal prescriptions of notation, and in this gap indeterminate interpretations

712 are introduced that explore authorial misdirection or even unintended results

713 (how, for example, as a pianist, would you ‘‘put yourself in the shade,’’ as the

714 score instructs?). As historian Liz Kotz has argued, such a hybridity in a work

715 points to a ‘‘conceptual ambiguity’’ of text-based scoring that ‘‘derives from the

716 use of the text as score [as] inseparably both writing/printed object and per-

717 formance/‘realization.’ ’’67 Cage’s recovery of Satie was motivated in part by the

718 latter’s intentionally ambiguous scoring; the confusion between scripting and

719 dialogue in the play resulted in a contingent performance full of unpredictable

720 or unintended effects.

721The Ruse of Medusa ’s ambiguities—its absurd monologues and unrelated

722 musical interludes, combined with dance and physical slapstick—alerted Cage

723 to the possibility of seemingly arbitrary relationships between actions in a per-

724 formance. In the apparent randomness of its plotting, Satie’s work departed

725 from previous, more methodical theatrical events at Black Mountain. Even so,

726 the production still drew from a script and rehearsals, in addition to functioning

727 quite successfully as a comedic piece that lent levity to the provocation posed

728 by Cage’s lectures and his single-minded advocacy of Satie. (The play’s sense of

729 lightheartedness was especially pronounced as several Black Mountain faculty

730 members performed self-deprecating, jokey roles in the production.)68 An ex-

731 amination of the ordered unity of a visual field at the College was thus replaced,

732 by the late 1940s, with diametrically opposed practices: dispersion, ambiguity,

733 and inattention. Cage couched this shift in a return to Dada, by revisiting Satie’s

734 snappy and illogical explorations of the ludic and the disruptive effects of word,

735 dance, and sound play.

736 Upon his next visit, Cage extended his methods into something one could

737 more properly term experimental (in his case, the chance protocol)—his hap-

738 pening Theater Piece No. 1. For Cage, ‘‘Happenings …have this thing we’ve

739 spoken of as carelessness in them. Carelessness comes about through . . .

740 ‘non-matrixed’ activity.’’69 Just how he composed and performed nonmatrixed

741 or nonarranged activity is the crux of his chance protocol, and it pushes be-

742 John Cage’s ChanCe ProtoCols 77

743 yond Dada’s attempt to trouble if not end ‘‘art’’ by exacerbating cultural illogic.

744 It comes by way of a most quixotic pairing: Zen and early twentieth-century

745 French art.

746 cIrca 1952: somEthIng Is happEnIng hErE

747 In his first summer at Black Mountain, Cage was just beginning to make inroads

748 in the new post-‘‘German aesthetician’’ version of experimentation of which

749 the Satie play and lectures were key mileposts.70 As he recalled, in 1948 he still

750 ‘‘saw eye-to-eye with Albers at the time, and our conversations were ones char-

751 acterized by agreement.’’71 Though separated by a generation, both men were

752 equally zealous about defining and propagating their respective visions of mod-

753 ernist experimentation, and once Cage introduced chance into his practice,

754 they would forever disagree about its role in art production.

755 The eventual split between the two emerged from a fundamental and intrac-

756 table conflict between their visions for the role of the test in fostering unfore-

757 seen experiences in art. For Albers, because experimentation was the subtle

758 and penetrating work of training the eye and mind to recognize illusion, art

759 practice was therefore situated within a spectrum of design that began with

760 technical proficiency and then produced subtle and carefully organized contin-

761 gency through serial variation. For Cage, in contrast, contingency was a means

762 of unleashing unpredictable aleatory processes that were nonetheless generat-

763 ed by systematic controls. By 1952, his procedures had the effect of drastically

764 devaluing (in anarchic fashion) the role of authorial control in artistic produc-

765 tion, encouraging new types of indeterminate performances in which events

766 unforeseen by artist, performer, or audience could transpire.72 Where Albers

767 argued that ‘‘rehearsal precedes performance,’’ such a notion of rehearsal was

768 precisely what Cage attempted to remove, without substituting expressionistic

769 improvisations on the part of the performer.73

770 Occluding the Albersian conception of experimentation he characterized

771 as a ‘‘marriage of form and content,’’ Cage’s subsequent performance events

772 at the College attempted to leave both the composition and the effects of per-

773 formance actions intentionally open-ended, as much as possible.74 Albers ab-

774 horred Cage’s incitement of artworks left open to accident: as Cage explained,

775 ‘‘When, in 1952, I took the path of chance, and later indeterminacy, our friend-

776 ship was broken …he couldn’t bear the real implications which I then carried

777 out. And he felt that I was renouncing my responsibility as an artist.’’75

778 It was upon this visit, in 1952, that Cage radically disrupted previous mod-

779 els of performance at the College, including his own, by introducing over-

78078 chapter two lapping activities and inaugurating both a dispersal of attention and a radical

781 narrative fragmentation. With Theater Piece No. 1, Cage worked in the wake of

782 Black Mountain legacies such as the theater-in-the-round, circus-like events

783 previously organized at the College by the Light-Sound-Movement Work-

784 shop led by Betty and Peter Jennerjahn in the late 1940s, which were revived

785 in the summer of 1951 by M. C. Richards and choreographer Katherine Litz.

786 The Jennerjahns, for example, in collaboration with about a dozen College

787 students and faculty, had improvised short theater pieces, sometimes ‘‘limit-

788 ed to a minute, or so,’’ incorporating projected slides, improvised music, and

789 dance elements.76 Like these precursors at the College, Cage’s Theater Piece

790No. 1 eschewed extensive rehearsals and previously arranged scripting, cos-

791 tuming, music, and characterization; it emphasized simultaneously occurring

792 events and immediacy, and closely considered how to organize the perfor-

793 mance space with respect to the audience, who was often understood as a

794 community of possible participants.

795 Drawing on these precedents, by 1952 Cage was developing chance-derived

796 compositional methods obtained from parameters provided by the I Ching, or

797 the Book of Changes, an ancient Chinese text of divination. In particular, his

798 score for Music of Changes (1951) had been a turning point; during its compo-

799 sition he would ‘‘ask’’ specific ‘‘questions’’ about features of the score, and then

800 make coin tosses or casts of the traditional yarrow sticks to assemble the hexa-

801 grams the I Ching requires; he then used the ‘‘answers’’ to select the duration,

802 tempo, and other dynamics of the composition.77 Cage expressly employed only

803 the structure of the I Ching’s complex randomization features, not its divinatory

804 aspects. As he contended of the innovation of chance composition, ‘‘My work

805 became an exploration of non-intention. To carry it out faithfully I have devel-

806 oped a complicated composing means using I Ching chance operations, making

807 my responsibility that of asking questions instead of making choices.’’78

808 Let’s keep that phrase, ‘‘asking questions instead of making choices,’’ in

809 mind while considering Theater Piece No. 1 and the works composed around

810 it. In early August of 1952, Cage and his frequent collaborator, pianist David

811 Tudor (also at Black Mountain that summer, though he had first arrived at the

812 College in 1951 as piano accompanist to Litz), formulated ideas for a perfor-

813 mance with multiple participants who would perform discrete activities during

814 various overlapping time segments totaling forty-five minutes (see fig. 2.17).

815 Cage proposed that College Rector Charles Olson and faculty member Rich-

816 ards read their poetry, student Robert Rauschenberg display his paintings and

817 play records or project slides, and Cunningham dance. Tudor was to perform

818 on the piano, and Cage would read from a previously prepared lecture on Zen

819 and the medieval mystic Meister Eckhart. To Cage, the piece represented the

820 John Cage’s ChanCe ProtoCols 79

821 possibility of events taking place without being causally related to one another;

822 as he claimed, Theater Piece No. 1 expressed ‘‘the centricity within each event

823 and its non-dependence on other events.’’79

824 Cage had in fact established strict time brackets and organized the perfor-

825 mance with particular time, content, and location parameters. His chance pro-

826 tocol, however, structured the piece’s score around instructions that had many

827 possible effects, which organized a set of open-ended possibilities. The most

828 radical break of such a scoring in Theater Piece No. 1 was the intentionally dis-

829 orienting effect of the performance, what Richards called its ‘‘sensory bombard-

830 ment’’; it decentered attention away from the visual apperception of a theatrical

831 event to the many intermittent, intermedia experiences Cage orchestrated in

832 and around the body of the spectator.80

833 When it was performed at Black Mountain in mid-August, Theater Piece

834No. 1 incorporated the last-minute addition of upside-down slides, likely

835 projected onto the tilted surfaces of a canopy of Rauschenberg’s monochromat-

836 ic White Paintings (fig. 2.3; works I will discuss later); the canopy was arranged

837 above and to one side of the central arrangement of chairs, which were orga-

838 nized as ‘‘a square composed on four triangles merging towards the center, but

839 not meeting’’81 (fig. 2.15). The seating arrangement allowed performers mobility

840 throughout the audience area, and directly followed, as will be discussed fur-

841 ther, Antonin Artaud’s pronouncement that ‘‘the spectator, placed in the mid-

842 dle of the action, is engulfed and physically affected by it …immerse[d] . . . in

843PIC

844 Figure 2.15

845 Performance seats and stage space for John Cage’s Theater

846Piece No. 1, 1952. Published in Michael Kirby and Richard

847 Schechner, ‘‘An Interview with John Cage,’’ Tulane Drama

848Review 10, no. 2 (Winter 1965).

84980 chapter two

850PIC

851 Figure 2.16

852 M. C. Richards’s diagram of John Cage’s Theater Piece No. 1, 1952.

853 Reconstructed in 1989 for publication in James Fetterman, John

854Cage’s Theater Pieces (New York: Routledge, 1996), 74. Courtesy

855 of the Estate of M. C. Richards.

856 a constant bath of light, images, movements and noises.’’82 Olson and Richards

857 ascended a ladder at various points to read for their segments; some claim that

858 Tudor played Cage’s 1952 composition Water Music, and films were likely pro-

859 jected by student Nicholas Cernovich.83 A dog or dogs barked at Cunningham

860 throughout the piece, and hot coffee was served (as part of the performance)

861 in cups that had been set at each seat, regardless of whether they had been pre-

862 viously used as ashtrays during the event. Figure 2.16 is a retrospective map of

863 the event by Richards—no photographs of the performance exist.

864 Cage’s incorporation of multiple events of indeterminate outcome in The-

865ater Piece No. 1 provoked a mixed response at its debut. Testimonies confirm

866 that the event left some in the audience confounded and even hostile. Com-

867 poser Stefan Wolpe, previously a Bauhaus student and currently teaching at

868 the College, ‘‘bitched’’ about the chaos and left in protest; some thought it was

869 ‘‘quite boring’’ to sit through though, while others claimed it was ‘‘an interesting

870 experiment’’; still others conceded that ‘‘you weren’t supposed to understand

871 it literally.’’84 The seating arrangement discouraged a single vantage point, so

872 contradictory accounts of the evening circulated as the many simultaneous and

873 unrelated actions assailed spectators independently with several registers of

874 sonic, literary, dancerly, and visual events. Spectators were required to turn

875 their heads and move their bodies to see the actions taking place in a panorama

876 John Cage’s ChanCe ProtoCols 81

877 above and around them, and to follow competing strains of aural information

878 and coincident movement. In this sense, they were asked to become partici-

879 pants: by registering experiences in their bodies other than ones cued by visual

880 perception, and by Cage’s increasing phenomenological demands that audience

881 members engage the broader sensorium of their bodies with acoustic, tactile,

882 and even olfactory events.

883 Through its emphasis on simultaneity, the piece ostensibly revealed the

884 unmotivated, untidy flow of life that concentration stifles and conscious de-

885 sign suppresses. As Cunningham reflected on the night: ‘‘Life itself is all these

886 separate things going on at the same time. And contemporary society is so

887 extraordinarily complex that way. Not only things going on right around you,

888 but there are all the things that you hear instantly over the television, that are

889 going on someplace else …they’re happening at the same time.’’85 That life

890 involves a surfeit of difficult sensory information was its peculiar, splendid an-

891 archy, according to the logic Cage set out in Theater Piece No. 1. The simultane-

892 ity of events was the indelible and inescapable fact of the modern world, and

893 Cage’s happening created a situation that intensified its pandemonium (all the

894 while still framing the effect of randomness by a rigorously delimited score that

895 contained defined time brackets and specific instructions).

896 As Cage was incorporating ambient and overlapping noises in musical com-

897 position and performance, he was also redefining what a music score could be.

898 In his ‘‘score’’ for Theater Piece No. 1, for example, traditional musical notations

899 of staffs, bars, keys, and notes were replaced with telegraphic durational seg-

900 ments to be interpreted by the performer. An existing fragment given to one of

901 the performers (likely to Robert Rauschenberg or Nicholas Cernovich) reads,

902 in Cage’s hand (fig. 2.17):

903 Projector:

904 Begin at 16 min.

905 play freely until 23 min.

906 Begin again at 24:30

907 play freely until 35:45

908 Begin at 38:20

909 play freely until 44:2586

910 De-skilling musical language beyond its notation in bars, notes, keys, and

911 measures guaranteed that every event could be simply performed and would

912 produce unique and unpredictable results (although the exacting, time-based

913 constraints on the performer’s freedom could inversely be interpreted as fussy

914 and overbearing, not liberating). Whereas the quantity and length of the score’s

91582 chapter two

916PIC

917 Figure 2.17

918 John Cage, Script for Theater Piece No. 1, 1952. 8¡ Œ 11

919 paper. Music Division, The New York Public Library for the

920 Performing Arts, Astor, Lenox and Tilden Foundations.

921 sections were generated by Cage’s chance-derived use of the I Ching, the per-

922 formers’ interpretations of these instructional commands were ultimately un-

923 known to him. The score, however, produced no reciprocal lack of mastery on

924 the creator’s part—it was not Cage’s choices of which possibilities to put on the

925 table, so to speak, that were chance derived, merely the questions about their

926 specific details.

927 Because no photographic record or film footage of Theater Piece No. 1 exists,

928 to get a sense of its effect it is helpful to compare it to a surviving film recording

929 of Cage’s 1959 composition Water Walk, a work also based on timed segments,

930 that he performed during a television appearance in 196087 (fig. 2.18). In Water

931Walk Cage is the sole performer, amid a field of some thirty-four items: domes-

932 tic appliances and other household objects related to water or liquidity that are

933 spread over various tables and the floor—a pressure cooker releasing steam, a

934 rubber duck, a toy fish, an electric mixer, an ice cube tray filled with ice, a bottle

935 of Campari, and a bathtub filled with water—as well as some objects related to

936 music or timekeeping, including a piano, five radios, a Turkish cymbal, and

937 John Cage’s ChanCe ProtoCols 83

938PIC

939 Figure 2.18

940 Still frame from performance of John Cage’s Water Walk on I’ve

941Got a Secret, January 1960. Courtesy of FremantleMedia, North

942 America.

943 a stopwatch. In the three minutes of Water Walk, Cage methodically moves

944 among these objects: filling the blender with ice, slapping the radios, turning

945 on the blender, squeaking the rubber duck, filling a glass with ice, pouring Cam-

946 pari, and later drinking from it, while periodically consulting his stopwatch.

947Water Walk’s first seconds begin with Cage slamming down the lid of the piano

948 after putting the toy fish on its soundboard, and concludes with Cage knocking

949 the radios to the ground, acts of physical and aural aggression that he manages

950 to make appear calm and unemotional—premeditated—and even a bit slap-

951 stick-y.88 The deliberation and calculation of the performance, despite its mild

952 violence and cacophony, are surprising. During Cage’s systematic movements

953 through the space, he checks his watch like an athlete clocking pace. This ele-

954 ment of precision is striking in many performances of Cage’s works: the way the

955 chance protocol—the fixed, clocked segments that produce seemingly aleatory

956 results—lends a sense of dogged focus on time and duration to the perform-

957 er’s gestures (which can read as disinterestedness or obliviousness to audience

958 members, an audience that may expect a virtuosic memorization of the score,

959 as in ‘‘classical’’ music performances).

960 The score of Water Walk itself consists of a group of objects: a list of the

961 ‘‘instruments’’; a floor plan showing the placement of the props; three pages of

962 a timeline (one minute for each page) with descriptions, pictographic diagrams,

963 and notations of occurrence of events divided into five-second increments; and

96484 chapter two a list of notes ‘‘regarding some of the actions to be made in the order of occur-

965 rence’’ (fig. 2.19). Timings in the performed work are estimations: ‘‘Start watch

966 and then time actions as closely as possible to their appearance in the score.’’

967Water Walk itself was therefore relatively fixed in its performance, but for the

968 brisk yet unspecific tempo of the actions that were to be timed ‘‘as closely as

969 possible.’’89

970Water Walk’s paper score relies on two earlier Cage works: Water Music

971 (1952) and Fontana Mix (1958). Cage used the score of Fontana Mix (which, like

972 many of his scores of the 1950s, employed the I Ching as a randomizing tool) to

973 compose Water Walk and several other compositions; the former piece consists

974 of ten transparencies containing various numbers of dots, ten sheets of paper

975 with curved lines of various thicknesses, one transparency of a two-by-ten-inch

976 grid, and another of a straight line. The Fontana Mix score was itself indetermi-

977 nate (the performer was to superimpose the sheets to find ‘‘time units in which

978 the event may take place’’).90 According to Cage, the ‘‘graph units = any time

979 units,’’ thereby allowing the performance’s duration and tempo to be conceived

980 by the operator of the score. In its title and elements of pictorial scoring, Water

981Walk clearly resembles Cage’s Water Music, which David Tudor premiered in

982 May of 1952 at the New School for Social Research in New York before returning

983 to Black Mountain—likely the work Tudor was playing during Theater Piece

984PIC

985 Figure 2.19

986 John Cage, Score for Water Walk, January 1959. Copyright ľ

987 1961 by Henmar Press, Inc. Used by permission of C. F. Peters

988 Corporation. All rights reserved.

989 John Cage’s ChanCe ProtoCols 85

990PIC

991 Figure 2.20

992 John Cage, Score for Water Music, May 1952. Copyright ľ

993 1960 by Henmar Press, Inc. Used by permission of C. F. Peters

994 Corporation. All rights reserved.

995No. 1.91 Like Water Walk, the earlier Water Music emphasized the hybridity of

996 the score as a visual document and aural experience. As Cage explained,

997Water Music wishes to be a piece of music, but to introduce visual elements in

998 such a way that it can be experienced as theater. …I simply put into the chart

999 things that would produce not only sounds but that would produce actions

1000PIC

1001 that were interesting to see.92

1002 For example, in Water Music’s score, a descending tone of a steam whistle is

1003 depicted as a linear wave, and the instruction ‘‘Pour water from one recepta-

1004 cle to another’’ bears no musical notation whatsoever but is written in Cage’s

1005 distinctive all-caps handwriting that is in essence a kind of calligraphic visual

1006 design (fig. 2.20).

1007 In the sense that Cage described Water Music as introducing ‘‘visual ele-

1008 ments’’ that could be ‘‘experienced as theater,’’ one can begin to understand the

1009 chance protocol of Theater Piece No. 1 as perhaps one part ‘‘chance’’ to several

1010 parts ‘‘protocol’’—that the protocol’s criterion of experimental innovation is

1011 a demand to ‘‘produce actions that were interesting to see.’’ The staging of the

1012 Black Mountain College dining hall as a 360-degree panorama of competing

1013 aural and visual actions, often taking place simultaneously, was obviously not a

1014 random event; though the length of the time slots the performers were desig-

1015 nated and the other questions Cage asked of the I Ching were subject to chance,

101686 chapter two they were organized by his framing of the questions. And if Cage’s Water Walk

1017 television performance is any indication, it is likely that performers of Theater

1018Piece No. 1 utilized their time slots quite seriously, attempting, for example, to

1019 play the third projector segment for the precise six minutes and five seconds

1020 the score indicated—an officiousness distant from the reputation of ‘‘indeter-

1021 minate’’ compositions as haphazard or non-intentioned.93

1022 Similarly, in Cage’s 1952 composition 433, created during his time at Black

1023 Mountain (though having percolated in his mind for several years), the piece’s

1024 three time sections were chance-determined by use of the I Ching to be thir-

1025 ty-three seconds, two minutes and forty seconds, and one minute and twenty

1026 seconds apiece.94 When Tudor first performed 433, he placed on the piano the

1027 several sheets of the handwritten score, which was notated conventionally on

1028 sheet music with blank measures (figs. 2.21, 2.22). Upon beginning each section,

1029 he closed the lid of the piano and, glancing at a stopwatch, turned the pages of

1030 the score as time passed. When each section ended, he opened the piano lid.

1031 Though the score indicates there should be no intentional sound on the per-

1032 former’s part, as with Water Walk a great deal of theatricalization surrounds

1033 actualizing the matrices of Cage’s ‘‘non-matrixed’’ activity.

1034 Cage’s use of the I Ching was intertwined with his intensifying investigation

1035 of the revelatory possibilities of void-like events described in Zen Buddhist

1036 Figures 2.21 and 2.22

1037 David Tudor’s original version of John Cage’s 433, pages 3 and 4,

1038 1953. The John Cage Trust. Reproduced by permission of The Getty

1039 Research Institute, Los Angeles.

1040PIC

1041 John Cage’s ChanCe ProtoCols 87

1042PIC

1043 texts; he called these the ‘‘flow-through’’ of experiences that break down the

1044 ego’s barrier.95 Breaking down this barrier, for Cage, revealed the dominance

1045 of ‘‘no-mindedness,’’ or non-intention, in the world, which could be accessed

1046 via an experience of the body as a vessel for sound.96 This connection between

1047 sound and the ‘‘flow-through’’ of experiences followed his 1951 visit to an an-

1048 echoic (an echoless, insulated, and therefore soundproof ) chamber at Harvard

1049 University, during which his expectation of total acoustic withdrawal was over-

1050 turned.97 According to Cage, in the chamber he ‘‘heard two sounds, one high

1051 and one low. When I described them to the engineer in charge, he informed me

1052 that the high one was my nervous system in operation, the low one my blood in

1053 circulation.’’98 Cage had gone to a place where he expected there to be no sound,

1054 and yet sound was nevertheless present and discernible. (He claimed that it was

1055 then that the composition of 433 seemed possible; he realized that ‘‘until I die

1056 there will be sounds. And they will continue following my death. One need not

1057 fear about the future of music.’’)99 Silence was in actuality a ‘‘walking concert’’

1058 of the body; as Cage argued, ‘‘We call it ‘silence’ because it is free of our activity.

1059 It does not correspond to ideas of order or expressive feeling …[that] ‘deafen’

1060 us to the sounds themselves.’’100

1061 That the stimulation and plenitude of ‘‘no-mindedness’’ could be features

1062 of the ostensible void of an anechoic chamber Cage connected to ninth-cen-

1063 tury Buddhist sage Huang Po’s Doctrine of Universal Mind.101 In 1952, Cage be-

1064 gan studying the text at Black Mountain, partly as a result of attending Daisetz

1065 Teitaro Suzuki’s seminars on Buddhism in the mid-1940s, which Suzuki later

1066 taught at Columbia from 1952 to 1957 to great public acclaim.102 Cage credited

1067 his investigation of Po’s Doctrine as a central inspiration for the new directions

1068 his work at Black Mountain was taking, declaring,

1069 I had come through my study of Zen Buddhism with Suzuki to an appreciation

1070 of a particular text: I liked it more than the others connected with Zen Bud-

1071 dhism—it’s called The Huang Po Doctrine of Universal Mind. So one evening

1072 at Black Mountain …we read the entire Huang Po Doctrine with all the notes

1073 and everything …after that experience …people told me their lives had

1074 changed.103

1075 Po’s text describes various paths to spiritual enlightenment, and advocates

1076 strategies of disengagement from action and withdrawal from the preoccu-

1077 pations of conscious thought. The doctrine of ‘‘no purpose’’ described there-

1078 in suggests abandoning intentionality in order to avail the spirit to the true

1079 flux of experience. To Po, attaining enlightenment was an unpredictable and

1080 chancy process, though certain foundational steps could be undertaken in

108188 chapter two preparation. He advocated a form of non-attachment and quietism in which

1082 ‘‘you need study no doctrines whatever, but learn only how to avoid seeking

1083 for and attaching yourselves to anything.’’104 Only when the mind and body

1084 were in a condition of harmonic balance, acting in concert with each other,

1085 could the ‘‘selflessness’’ of transcendence emerge. Po claimed that enlighten-

1086 ment may then arrive as an accident, as ‘‘a sudden self-realization’’ in a mo-

1087 ment of utter dispassion.105

1088 Cage was particularly impressed by Po’s assurance that reducing the inten-

1089 tionality of conscious thought—what Po referred to as ‘‘conceptual thought’’—

1090 laid a path to transcendence by way of bodily awareness. To Po, spiritual tran-

1091 scendence was possible for those who ‘‘would only eliminate all conceptual

1092 thought in a flash.’’106 By rejecting the mind’s demands toward reason, the spir-

1093 it would recognize the transitory nature of material phenomena and physical

1094 stimuli; as Po asserted, ‘‘Every phenomenon that exists is a creation of thought;

1095 therefore I need but empty my mind to discover that all of them are void.’’107

1096 Of special interest to Cage was Po’s championing an empty, receptive

1097 mind—an emptiness or ‘‘void’’ alert to the greater flux and changeability of

1098 transitory events. The sense of the void as open possibility became the correlate

1099 to Cage’s conception of an experiment as a protocol without predictable ends.

1100 As he explained,

1101 An experimental action, generated by a mind as empty as it was before it be-

1102 came one …does not move in terms of approximations and errors, as ‘‘in-

1103 formed’’ action by its nature must, for no mental images of what would happen

1104 were set up beforehand; it sees things directly as they are: impermanently

1105 involved in an infinite play of interpenetrations.109

1106 Cage related the notion of the void as impermanence, as a play of unpredictable

1107 difference, to his study at Black Mountain of Antonin Artaud’s work. Linking Po

1108 to Artaud, Cage saw similarities in their analyses of states of void-like instability

1109 in which the transcendence of routine and habit provided passage for unex-

1110 pected events and flashes of inspiration. In this sense, Theater Piece No. 1 was

1111 indelibly shaped by Black Mountain faculty member M. C. Richards’s ongoing

1112 translation of Artaud’s key texts, later compiled in the volume The Theater and

1113Its Double, which called for forms of theatrical performance that were utterly

1114 immediate and therefore not reliant on scripting or literary interpretation.

1115 Richards had been introduced to Artaud through her then partner Tudor’s

1116 studies in contemporary French musical composers. In his attempt to puzzle

1117 through Pierre Boulez’s 1948 Second Piano Sonata (confiding to Richards that

1118 though the sonata was complicated, he was actually ‘‘not having problems with

1119 John Cage’s ChanCe ProtoCols 89

1120 the notes, but with the music’’), Tudor had read Boulez’s sources for the work:

1121 poet Stéphane Mallarmé and Artaud.109 Richards, Tudor, and Cage discussed

1122 Artaud intensely at the College throughout the summer of 1952, and carefully

1123 studied chapters of The Theatre and Its Double as a companion to the Doctrine’s

1124 claims for the void-like elimination of intention.

1125 Artaud’s work, published first in France in 1938, collected essays and man-

1126 ifestos written throughout the previous two decades. It set forth a proposal

1127 for a ‘‘theater of cruelty’’ in which the effects of certain unpredictable actions

1128 onstage would shock viewers into a ‘‘new notion of space’’ when bombarded

1129 with many simultaneously occurring events.110 This new perception of space

1130 was characterized by ‘‘overlapping images and movements’’ and the ‘‘collusion

1131 of objects, silences, shouts, and rhythms’’ which together perform an ‘‘extreme

1132 action’’ pushing the spectator’s perception beyond its limits.111 In breaking down

1133 the viewer’s perceptual apparatus with overwhelming events, Artaud hoped to

1134 extend the effects of disorientation, ‘‘cruelty,’’ and the difficulty of perception

1135 off the stage and into the world beyond theatrical performance. As he main-

1136 tained, ‘‘There will be no unoccupied point in space, [and] there will be neither

1137 respite nor vacancy in the spectator’s mind or sensibility. That is, between life

1138 and the theater there will be no distinct division, but instead a continuity.’’112 It

1139 was an experience of shock in which the viewer’s previous understandings of

1140 art—art as separated from life—would be overturned. These acts of disturbance

1141 returned art to the chaotic conditions of life veiled by traditional theater’s codi-

1142 fied techniques and habits of scripting, narrativity, and characterization. Those

1143 now moribund aspects of theater would thereafter be supplanted by events of

1144 the world outside theater, thus initiating a ‘‘new’’ art that looked remarkably

1145 like the flux, chaos, and cruelty of ‘‘external’’ life while prismatically allowing

1146 for a critical vision of that life. Rather than revolutionizing the observation of

1147 conditions of the world outside theater by setting up a counterpoint of illusory

1148 effects (or even altering those ‘‘external’’ conditions themselves), art for Artaud

1149 must collapse its pretensions to autonomy and separation into already existing

1150 ‘‘life’’ conditions, thus producing a radical, destructive, and shocking break in

1151 the minds and bodies of spectators accustomed to a theater of affectation and

1152 habit. In sum, only by destroying the separation between theater and life could

1153 an invigorated sense of theater as life catalyze viewers to become aware of their

1154 relationship with natural ‘‘life’’ forces.

1155 To Cage, Artaud’s description of a barrage of simultaneous events raised

1156 ‘‘the possibility of making a theatrical event in which the things that took

1157 place were not causally related to one another.’’113 Interestingly, this is a claim

1158 Artaud himself never explicitly asserted. Cage, like Artaud, wanted to col-

1159 lapse the difference between theater and life, yet to Artaud the most radical

116090 chapter two feature of theater was its ability to compound visual and auditory effects in

1161 a dreamlike condensation of experience in which the spectator would lose a

1162 sense of the rules and conventions of the conscious mind. In viewing events

1163 as an endless accretion of disconnected moments, of different possible pres-

1164 ents, Artaud felt the theater of cruelty mimicked the ‘‘internal world’’ of the

1165 spectator; the ‘‘true illusion’’ of theater was the manner in which it reflected

1166 the ‘‘truthful precipitates of dreams’’ (dreams which, after all, do have causal

1167 connections that represent the logic of the unconscious, however latent those

1168 connecting threads may be).114

1169 In Cage’s application of Artaud’s theories of spectatorship to Theater Piece

1170No. 1, theater would literally act on the audience, but not by the mediation

1171 of acting or plotting, or by employing the unifying field of vision that joined

1172 a costumed actor with the obviously constructed spaces surrounding him or

1173 her, as in Bauhaus theater. Instead, it would do so by an escape from the ‘‘ra-

1174 tionalism’’ of premeditated, written theater performance. Artaud advocated

1175 a theater of ‘‘powerful feeling [that] produces in us the idea of the void . . .

1176 the real void of nature.’’115 Effects of void-like states, what he claimed were

1177 the ‘‘deepest states of mind beyond thought,’’ could be attained in a multi-

1178 sensory experience: it was ‘‘in the light of magic and sorcery that the mise

1179en scène must be considered …as the burning projection of all the objective

1180 consequences of a gesture, word, sound, music, and their combinations.’’116

1181 Only then would the ‘‘sorcery’’ of theater spiral the spectator into the doubled

1182 world of his or her own unconscious.117

1183 It is noteworthy that Oskar Schlemmer, Xanti Schawinsky, and Antonin

1184 Artaud invoked the notion of illusion as central to a new awareness and self-re-

1185 flexivity they hoped to awaken in their audiences. Yet while Schlemmer saw

1186 the theater as a space of illusion, it was an illusion constructed through focused

1187 attention, not void-like states. In contrast to his and other Bauhaus figures’ ra-

1188 tional examinations of spaces, transacted in the controlled environment of the

1189 theater, to Artaud the immediacy of the present allowed spectators particular

1190 purchase on ‘‘void’’ experiences; any attempts to translate or express the void

1191 through the temporally ‘‘dissembling’’ process of scripting (in which thoughts,

1192 ideas, and intentions from the past hijacked the free expression of ‘‘feelings

1193 and passions’’ in the present) corrupted the truth of immediacy.118 The chaos of

1194 the many simultaneous events onstage would induce experiences of shock in

1195 the audience, and for this reason Artaud insistently opposed the preeminence

1196 of dialogue in theater; as he stated in The Theater and Its Double, ‘‘Our purely

1197 verbal theater [is] unaware of everything that makes theater, of everything that

1198 exists in the air of the stage, which is measured and circumscribed by that air

1199 and has a density in space—movements, shapes, colors, vibrations, attitudes,

1200 John Cage’s ChanCe ProtoCols 91

1201 screams.’’119 This of course echoes Schlemmer’s call for a theater exploring spa-

1202 tial arrangements in the context of bodily movement. Yet in contrast to the de-

1203 liberate and ordered experimentation in Schlemmer’s work (he often referred

1204 to his practice as ‘‘research experiment’’), Artaud stressed the mutability and

1205 contingency of the theatrical space, stating that ‘‘the theater is the only place

1206 in the world where a gesture, once made, can never be made the same way

1207 twice.’’120 In place of the Bauhaus idea of bodies oriented through calculated

1208 geometries of space, Artaud proposed a ‘‘total spectacle’’ in which ‘‘an intensive

1209 mobilization of objects, gestures, and signs’’ provided ‘‘sudden shocks to revive

1210 our understanding.’’121 These shocks could be accomplished through immediacy

1211 and accident: theater should be as violent as ‘‘natural forces’’ that are subject to

1212 ‘‘interventions of chance.’’122

1213 Cage adapted Artaud’s sense of extrahuman ‘‘natural forces’’ as accidental

1214 and arbitrary; theater was a means to succumb to the greater chaos of those

1215 unintended, uncontrollable consequences. Such forces appear cruel or ‘‘tyr-

1216 annous,’’ in Cage’s understanding of Artaud, only because attempts by human

1217 agents to organize and control them create friction between people and their

1218 environments. For Cage, the rational pseudo-order of the mind was to be abol-

1219 ished in favor of the real order of chance. He often invoked earlier Dadaist em-

1220 ployments of chance to supplement his employment of Artaud’s arguments.

1221 Marcel Duchamp’s work in particular was a touchstone for Cage’s notion of

1222 experimentation as the acceptance of accident and the elimination of conscious

1223 interference—those features of Cage’s turn to chance that had so offended Al-

1224 bers. Cage advocated reconsidering Duchamp’s uses of chance not only as a

1225 means to compose, but also as a tool to attain random or indeterminate re-

1226 sults in experimental acts, boldly declaring, ‘‘One way to write music: study

1227 Duchamp.’’123 In particular, he credited Duchamp with opening up a space of

1228 expanded, nonjudgmental awareness: his bottle racks and bicycle wheels un-

1229 derscored the dialogical experience of the art object, its recognition as art based

1230 on a community of understanding rather than any innate quality of the work.

1231 To Duchamp, the unsubjective or ‘‘casual’’ selection of a readymade was key;

1232 the work should be as randomly chosen and therefore as affectless as possible.

1233 As he wrote,

1234 It is necessary to arrive at selecting an object with the idea of not being im-

1235 pressed by this object on the basis of enjoyment of any order. However, it

1236 is difficult to select an object that absolutely does not interest you, not only

1237 on the day on which you select it, and which does not have any chance of

1238 becoming attractive or beautiful and which is neither pleasant to look at nor

1239 particularly ugly.124

124092 chapter two To Duchamp, an artist’s nominative act—the declaration itself regardless of

1241 the object—was itself the art. He could choose anything indifferent to, or even

1242 in spite of, its aesthetic merits. Thus began a conceptual leap of faith that con-

1243 tinued to define the condition of art’s intelligibility for Cage. Coupled with

1244 the disinterestedness of the selection of readymade, Duchamp’s approach to

1245 chance also employed a paradox of intentional non-intention in its experimen-

1246 tal method.

1247 One would think that Duchamp’s 1913 musical score Erratum Musique

1248 (which can be translated as ‘‘musical misprint’’), in which twenty-five notes

1249 from F below middle C to high F were drawn from a hat by Duchamp and his

1250 two sisters, would have been pivotal to Cage. Yet Cage stated of the work, ‘‘I

1251 wouldn’t be satisfied with that kind of chance operation in my work. …I enjoy

1252 details and like things to be more complicated.’’125 Instead, of central importance

1253 was Duchamp’s piece 3 Standard Stoppages of 1913--14, in which he dropped a

1254 one-meter length of string three times and recorded the resulting forms (Cage

1255 apparently attempted to replicate the work)126 (plate 13). In creating templates

1256 of the three trials, Duchamp transformed the ‘‘standard’’ of measure into an

1257 indexical reflection of a seemingly arbitrary event. Describing this as ‘‘canned

1258 chance,’’ he underscored how the organizational protocol of the ‘‘experiment’’

1259 resulted in repeatable, quantifiable, and measurable events, though each ‘‘find-

1260 ing’’ was ultimately unpredictable. As philosopher Ian Hacking has written,

1261 such a protocol can be said to use ‘‘chance devices to introduce a new level of

1262 control into experimentation. Control not by getting rid of chance fluxuations,

1263 but by adding some more.’’127 Like a statistical study in which randomization

1264 and stochastic variation are harnessed to eliminate bias, Duchamp’s ‘‘canned

1265 chance,’’ in a most contradictory fashion, allowed each event’s specificity to

1266 emerge by minimizing the subjective element in ‘‘human error.’’

1267 The aleatory elements that Duchamp incorporated in the creation of 3 Stan-

1268dard Stoppages stressed what he called the ‘‘chain of totally subjective reactions’’

1269 the artist undergoes in planning and realizing a creative act.128 The results of

1270 a chance operation, however, emphasized how chance in fact minimized the

1271 subjectivity of the artist:

1272 ‘‘Theory’’

1273 10 words found by opening the dictionary at random by A

1274 10 words found by opening the dictionary at random by B

1275 These 2 sets of 10 words have the same difference of ‘‘personality’’ as if the 10

1276 words had been written by A and B with an intention. Or else, it matters little,

1277 there would be cases where this ‘‘personality’’ may disappear in A and B. That is

1278 the best case and most difficult.129

1279 John Cage’s ChanCe ProtoCols 93

1280 To Duchamp, subjective ‘‘personality’’ could be effaced if chance events were

1281 not random at all—if arbitrary selections could somehow be made repeatable

1282 among a large-enough sample of chance events. The use of chance creates

1283 unique and diverse experiences that the human mind cannot predict, yet the

1284 mind is so varied and complex that after a few deliberative selections of words,

1285 a subjective and seemingly irrational range of possibilities and associations

1286 emerge that can be as difficult to causally explain as a chance event. Even sam-

1287 ples generated by choice or intention produce seemingly chancy differences; to

1288 Duchamp, the ideal scenario—‘‘the best case’’—resulted when these two situa-

1289 tions, randomness and intention, became coincident and when no distinction

1290 could be perceived between chance and design. Such a de-differentiation could

1291 null all forms of intention, though that remained only the ‘‘most difficult’’ and

1292 remote scenario.

1293 Chance processes, to Duchamp, were paradoxically determinate in their

1294 composition (the control exerted by the creator in setting up the event), while

1295 producing indeterminate outcomes: ‘‘Your chance is different than mine.’’130

1296 Yet ‘‘canned chance’’—the way in which chance generates results only as dif-

1297 ferent as two different subjectivities—inserts elements of indeterminacy and

1298 randomness to create a wider range of possible outcomes, not capricious re-

1299 sults.131 Duchamp employed chance to refute habit and bias; he understood

1300 it as a practice with predictable operations though indeterminate results—in

1301 other words, as a chance protocol. No process of manipulating results, delin-

1302 eating beginnings and endings, or structuring propositions for chance activ-

1303 ities wholly eliminates intentionality; chance protocols, as executed in Dada

1304 and later by Cage, do not reject motivated action. In fact, chance processes

1305 exemplify types of technique and control that are highly motivated and aspire

1306 to eliminate the emotional biases of both individuals and systems. As critic

1307 Ian Pepper has noted, Cage’s ‘‘aesthetics of indifference’’ was in actuality a

1308 ‘‘ ‘discipline’ governed by the liquidation of intention, habit, and agency.’’132

1309 Indeed, Cage later rephrased his ‘‘questions not choices’’ formulation thusly:

1310 ‘‘Most people who believe that I’m interested in chance don’t realize that I

1311 use chance as a discipline. They think I use it—I don’t know—as a way of giv-

1312 ing up making choices.’’133 Chance in composition was a project predicated on

1313 assumptions that it produced new understandings of order. Chance is always

1314 laden with intention. In his years at and post-Black Mountain College, defin-

1315 ing just whose intention reigned became the ground for mounting critiques of

1316 Cage’s notion of the experimental act.

131794 chapter two

1318PIC

1319 Plate 1

1320 Color Study IV-3. From Josef Albers, Interaction of Color

1321 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1963/1971).

1322 ľ Yale University Press; courtesy Yale University Press.

1323PIC

1324 Plate 2

1325 Josef Albers, template for a Variant study, n.d. 12 Œ 19.

1326 Photograph by Tim Nighswander ľ The Josef and Anni

1327 Albers Foundation / Artists Rights Society, New York.

1328PIC

1329 Plate 3

1330 Josef Albers, Variant, 1947. Oil on Masonite, 12 Œ 18.

1331 Photograph by Tim Nighswander ľ The Josef and Anni

1332 Albers Foundation / Artists Rights Society, New York.

1333PIC

1334 Plate 4

1335 Josef Albers, Variant: Southern Climate, 1948--53. Oil on Masonite, 1214

1336 Œ 22¡. Photograph by Tim Nighswander ľ The Josef and Anni Albers

1337 Foundation / Artists Rights Society, New York.

1338PIC

1339 Plate 5

1340 Josef Albers, Variant: Southern Climate, 1948--53, detail.

1341 Photograph by Eva Díaz ľ The Josef and Anni Albers

1342 Foundation / Artists Rights Society, New York.

1343PIC

1344 Plate 6

1345 Josef Albers, Variant, 1947--55. Oil on Masonite, 26 Œ 2814.

1346 Photograph by Tim Nighswander ľ The Josef and Anni

1347 Albers Foundation / Artists Rights Society, New York.

1348PIC

1349 Plate 7

1350 Josef Albers, Study for a Variant (III), C, 1947. Pencil and

1351 oil on paper, 9116 Œ 1178. Photograph by Tim Nighswander

1352 ľ The Josef and Anni Albers Foundation / Artists Rights

1353 Society, New York.

1354PIC

1355 Plate 8

1356 Josef Albers, Homage to the Square, 1958. Oil on Masonite, 18 Œ

1357 18. Photograph ľ Judd Foundation. Courtesy Judd Foundation

1358 Archive.

1359PIC

1360 Plate 9

1361 Josef Albers, Lettering Set, 1926--31. Milk glass on painted wood.

1362 The Josef and Anni Albers Foundation / Artists Rights Society,

1363 New York. Digital Image ľ The Museum of Modern Art/Licensed

1364 by SCALA / Art Resource, NY.

1365PIC

1366 Plate 10

1367 Xanti Schawinsky, Sound and Chord

1368 Demonstration, Spectodrama Sketch

1369#5, 1936--37. The Xanti Schawinsky

1370 Estate.

1371PIC

1372 Plate 11

1373 Xanti Schawinsky, Spectodrama

1374 8: Building (Tensional), 1936--37.

1375 Photocollage on paper, 16 Œ 21.1.

1376 The Xanti Schawinsky Estate.

1377PIC

1378 Plate 12

1379 Xanti Schawinsky, Spectodrama

1380 5: Form and Language, 1936--37.

1381 Photocollage and pen on paper, 16.6 Œ

1382 20.4. The Xanti Schawinsky Estate.

1383PIC

1384 Plate 13

1385 Marcel Duchamp, 3 Standard Stoppages. Paris, 1913--14. Wood

1386 box 1118 Œ 5078 Œ 9, with three threads 3938, glued to three

1387 painted canvas strips 5ij Œ 47ij, each mounted on a glass panel

1388 7ij Œ 4938 Œ ij, three wood slats 2¡ Œ 43 Œ 18, shaped along

1389 one edge to match the curves of the threads. ľ 2012 Artists

1390 Rights Society New York / ADAGP, Paris / Succession Marcel

1391 Duchamp. Digital Image ľ The Museum of Modern Art/Licensed

1392 by SCALA / Art Resource, NY.

1393PIC

1394 Plate 14

1395 Buckminster Fuller, Dymaxion Air-Ocean World Map, 1954/1981.

1396 29-color silkscreen on Arches 100% rag paper, 50 Œ 72. Edition

1397 of 85. Courtesy Carl Solway Gallery, Cincinnati, Ohio.

1398PIC

1399 Plate 15

1400PIC

1401 Buckminster Fuller, World Energy. First published in Fortune,

1402 February 1940. Courtesy The Estate of R. Buckminster Fuller.

1403PIC

1404 Plate 16

1405 Buckminster Fuller, World Energy Map, 1953. Published in

1406 Herbert Bayer’s World Geo-Graphic Atlas. Courtesy The

1407 Estate of R. Buckminster Fuller.

1408PIC

1409 Plate 17

1410 Buckminster Fuller holding model of Autonomous Dwelling

1411Machine, 1947, next to model of same, assembled and housed

1412 inside geodesic dome, ca. 1950s. Courtesy The Estate of R.

1413 Buckminster Fuller.

1414PIC

1415 Plates 18, 19

1416 Robert Rauschenberg, Factum I and Factum II, 1957. Both: Oil,

1417 ink, pencil, crayon, paper, fabric, newspaper, printed reproduc-

1418 tions, and painted paper on canvas, 6138 Œ 35¡ each. ľ Robert

1419 Rauschenberg Foundation/Licensed by VAGA, New York, NY.

1420PIC

1421PIC

1422 Plate 20

1423 Ray Johnson, James Dean (Lucky Strike), 1957. Ink, collage, and

1424 paper on cardboard, 18 Œ 15.375. ľ Ray Johnson Estate. Courte-

1425 sy Richard L. Feigen & Co.

1426 chancE protocols anD thE polItIcs oF thE arbItrary

1427 One way to understand the chance-protocol experiment is as a proposition that

1428 produces indeterminate results that must be accepted rather than judged—not

1429 as the production of material evidence to be evaluated, as Albers had argued.

1430 Cage’s model of experimentation minimized purposeful communication be-

1431 tween artist and audience, positing such exchanges as the obsolete habit of

1432 imposing predictable regularity on both the audience’s interpretive freedom

1433 and on the underlying, fundamentally unknowable organization of nature. In

1434 these proposals of chance and indeterminacy, Cage argued that a new dimen-

1435 sion of perception could be revealed outside human faculties of organization,

1436 assessment, and intention: ‘‘Not an attempt to bring order out of chaos nor to

1437 suggest improvements in creation, but simply a way of waking up to the very

1438 life we’re living, which is so excellent once one gets one’s mind and one’s desires

1439 out of its way and lets it act of its own accord.’’134

1440 In Cage’s turn to a chance-protocol version of experimentation, his work

1441 received degrees of public exposure and notoriety that eclipsed nearly all other

1442 practices at Black Mountain College. In contrast to Albers’s largely unpublished

1443 writings, Cage’s discussions about his influences, and his commentaries on the

1444 development of procedures he was terming ‘‘experimental’’ as early as his first

1445 public talks in 1937 at age twenty-five, were widely published. By 1961, they

1446 were compiled in Silence, his influential collection of essays and lectures.135

1447 Cage’s methodology of experimentation underwent many transformations in

1448 his long life, but what is pertinent to a study of him at Black Mountain—why he

1449 is such a vital case study of experimentation there—is the way he used his rela-

1450 tively brief time at the College to test rapidly maturing ideas about prolonging

1451 the creative process of experimentation in order to generate unpredictable com-

1452 positions, and extending this new process to a work’s reception in performance

1453 situations of unfixed outcome.

1454 Moreover, in contrast to Albers’s long association with the College as a

1455 teacher and artist, Cage’s own work in this vein overshadowed his pedagogi-

1456 cal strategies, which at least during his Black Mountain years were quite un-

1457 derdeveloped. When, for example, he found students unwilling to enroll in

1458 his summer 1952 class at the College, the stated goal of which was to appren-

1459 tice helpers to do the tedious work of cutting and splicing bits of magnetic

1460 tape for his composition Williams Mix, Cage canceled all formal teaching for

1461 the term. His tenure at the College is most closely associated with his key

1462 performance events, and the way he formulated arguments about them into

1463 a new and persuasive experimental model that only later became the basis of

1464 John Cage’s ChanCe ProtoCols 95

1465 an influential pedagogy (in his Experimental Composition classes at the New

1466 School for Social Research and elsewhere).

1467 Ultimately, Cage attributed his split with Albers to the issue of chance as rat-

1468 ifying a new and uniquely American, as opposed to European, hence tradition-

1469 al, aesthetic; he declared that he ‘‘was more interested in a mediocre thing that

1470 is being made now, which is avant-garde, than …in the performance of a great

1471 masterpiece of the past.’’136 In this he distanced himself from existing European

1472 (that is, German) artistic, musical, and theatrical currents at the College; yet

1473 as we have seen, he did this by linking his work with Far Eastern, particular-

1474 ly Chinese, as well as French models. In repudiating the dominant German

1475 harmonic tradition of Beethoven through Schoenberg, Cage supplanted that

1476 canon with overlooked French composers such as Satie, Claude Debussy, and

1477 Edgard Varèse (as he bemoaned, ‘‘No Germans take French music seriously’’).137

1478 In contrast to the German precedents reverberating in the work of Albers and

1479 other émigrés at the College, he abandoned their attentive examination of the

1480 structure and serial organization of form, though he continued to pursue their

1481 familiarly modernist goal of changing audiences’ relationships to established

1482 patterns of perception. In this, Cage’s model of experimentation paradoxically

1483 attempted to script, or rather to score, what he perceived as the eternal and

1484 underlying randomness of life rarely apparent in the rules and discipline of art

1485 and other cultural systems of order.

1486 Cage sought greater indeterminacy so as to prove the fundamental useless-

1487 ness of forms of human intervention in the order of nature. He saw his work as

1488 promoting the ‘‘disappearance of power politics’’ as part of a new, holistic ‘‘total

1489 system’’ existing outside human determination.138 Freewheeling riskiness—the

1490 underlying order of the world as he perceived it—was too often impeded by

1491 the imposition of false order (political, artistic, or otherwise). One should, in

1492 Cage’s words, ‘‘experiment endlessly’’ to unfix determinations of all sorts and

1493 rid the world of all manner of social and artistic habits, including the habit to

1494 think about the world as susceptible to change.139 In this last respect, the title of

1495 Cage’s essay from which the previous quotes are drawn is quite telling: ‘‘Diary:

1496 How to Improve the World (You Will Only Make Matters Worse).’’

1497 Threaded with his study of Duchamp, Antonin Artaud, and Zen prece-

1498 dents, Cage framed his experiments with chance and indeterminacy at Black

1499 Mountain as an expansion of performance toward the incorporation of simul-

1500 taneously occurring and happenstance events.140 In this, he linked his ideas

1501 to Robert Rauschenberg’s works. Rauschenberg was in 1951 exploring the

1502 ultimate ‘‘anti-art’’ provocation, the monochromatic canvas, and his varied

1503 and prolific output during his years at Black Mountain included his so-called

1504Black Paintings, in which he layered dirt and paint over newsprint, and his

150596 chapter two entirely White Paintings, shown during Theater Piece No. 1. These works tested

1506 the boundaries of an image’s legibility by exploring the limits of minimal de-

1507 notation, and flirted with the possibility of void-like emptiness. Cage referred

1508 to the White Paintings series as ‘‘airports for lights, shadows and particles,’’

1509 and attributed to Rauschenberg a passivity against composition and order

1510 that he himself advocated141 (fig. 2.3). Cage claimed that in the White Paintings

1511 ‘‘there is the same acceptance of what happens and no tendency towards ges-

1512 ture or arrangement.’’142

1513 Cage was intrigued with how the white canvases seemed to enhance the

1514 experience of typically overlooked events—the way, for example, the paint-

1515 ings amplified shadows, or how their color and appearance varied according

1516 to light conditions. Cage credited Rauschenberg with opening up a space of

1517 apparent emptiness and revealing it to be in fact full of diverse activity and ex-

1518 perience. Indeed, during Theater Piece No. 1, if we are to believe some accounts,

1519 Rauschenberg’s works oscillated between acting as paintings and operating as

1520 screens for slides or films—deployed as scenography within a theatrical situa-

1521 tion rather than functioning as singular artworks.

1522 In part, Cage attributed his 1952 composition of 433 to Rauschenberg’s

1523 challenge of empty openness. The score’s ‘‘silence’’ was in actuality full of

1524 ‘‘sound’’—the coughs, fidgets, and whispers of the audience, in addition to any

1525 other ambient noises. Cage argued that just as there was no emptiness in the

1526White Paintings, there was also no silence in life. He felt that the ‘‘unfocused

1527 attention’’ of the paintings, like the voids advocated by Po and Artaud, was an

1528 attack against the separation of thought and experience, intention and imme-

1529 diacy, and in particular, art and life.143 As Cage proclaimed, ‘‘Art’s obscured the

1530 difference between art and life. …Where there’s a history of organization (art),

1531 introduce disorder.’’144

1532 As historian Branden Joseph has noted, Cage equated ‘‘intentional action’’ with

1533 a defense of the category of art, a schema that posited disorder as the underly-

1534 ing process of life, and chance as a ‘‘purer perception of reality.’’146 Awakening

1535 the mind to the infinite and ultimately unknowable indeterminacy of nature

1536 was the objective, if such an interest in revealing the workings of nature can be

1537 said to have a goal at all. Herein lies the paradox at the center of Cage’s chance

1538 protocol, a paradox of which he was well aware: he exerted control in fostering

1539 situations of greater indeterminacy because he believed that the world was fun-

1540 damentally contingent and its possibilities indeterminate. As Cage proclaimed,

1541 ‘‘It’s what you might call a ‘music of contingency,’ which means that you’re

1542 necessary but not in control.’’146

1543 John Cage’s ChanCe ProtoCols 97

1544 It can be argued, however, that though indeterminate outcomes permit the

1545 appearance of freedom, they may in fact mistake the nature of the order they

1546 seek to sidestep. In a 1981 text that apostatizes the Cagean methods she had

1547 been associated with in early 1960s Judson Dance Theater, artist Yvonne Rainer

1548 contended that chance strategies were deployed ‘‘to equalize and suppress hi-

1549 erarchical differentiations of meaning.’’147 In trying to reshuffle predictable out-

1550 comes without creating intentional alternatives, Cage’s posture of dispassionate

1551 quiescence attempted to stifle the desire to influence at all—a stance that is re-

1552 markably amenable to a meek acceptance of the status quo. Challenging Cage,

1553 Rainer argued, ‘‘To have no desire—for ‘improvements on creation’—is neces-

1554 sarily co-equal to having no quarrel with God-given manifestations of reality.’’

1555 For Rainer, Cage ultimately ignored that ‘‘we are surrounded by manifestations

1556 of reality that are not God-given but all fucked up by human society and that

1557 must be contested and reordered.’’148 Attempting to transcend conditions of de-

1558 termination in the interest of greater contingency, Cage’s chance protocol may

1559 serve to rationalize the chance operator’s ‘‘questions’’ as though it were a whole

1560 new experience of a world without control that is being offered. In this space of

1561 relativism, judgments concerning interpretation are withheld, and an implicit

1562 trust is placed in ‘‘all answers answer[ing] all questions,’’ as Cage claimed.149

1563 Though Theater Piece No. 1 made the space of performance beyond the stage

1564 a part of the ‘‘event’’ in a more aggressive way, such a move may, on the one

1565 hand, imply making audience members into participants. Or, on the other, it

1566 can indicate that spectators are mere props to the action. As historian Judith

1567 Rodenbeck has pointed out, the word ‘‘happening …also implies a kind of

1568 passivity—‘it is happening to me’; in this respect it implies, too, an interesting

1569 desubjectification: the presence at an event of an objectified person.’’150 The

1570 instructional logic of Cage’s Theater Piece No. 1 stimulated many future artists,

1571 particularly his students in his Experimental Composition classes at the New

1572 School, but has been criticized for the manner in which happenings’ directives

1573 could sometimes only be narrowly interpreted.151 Does one actually participate

1574 in the ‘‘non-matrixed’’ or nonarranged activity Cage described if, as in the case

1575 of Theater Piece No. 1, one follows a time-notated script or watches someone

1576 doing so? Or does one merely passively follow instructions (as a performer),

1577 or submissively let the many simultaneous events flow over oneself (as a spec-

1578 tator)?

1579 The connection of the experimental chance protocol to arguments about

1580 spectatorial empowerment in this analysis should indicate how working ‘‘ex-

1581 perimentally’’ offers models to test and to organize new forms of collective

1582 agency. For Cage, indeterminacy in musical composition mirrored his idea of

1583 a fundamentally uncontrollable and anarchical world. Conversely, in attempt-

158498 chapter two ing to break down the intentions and order of society to emulate the chaotic

1585 character of nature, he was perhaps trying to fix a target that’s always moving.

1586 The attempt by avant-gardists to conceive of a rigid social order, to set points

1587 of opposition and fixed codes to transgress (reason, order, intention, and so

1588 on), may misrecognize the intractable problem of the symbolic order: that it’s

1589 always changing, and sometimes with a perverted rationality. Perhaps Cage

1590 set up order as a straw man, as a foil for his negations, thereby mistaking the at

1591 best distorted forms of rationality that characterize modernity’s instrumental

1592 reason. Or was he exposing the contingency of practices and discourses—aes-

1593 thetic, social, political, or other—that are otherwise pledged to convention,

1594 continuity, and order?

1595 Cage perceived nature as accidental and arbitrary, and saw experimenta-

1596 tion as a window onto the greater chaos of those unintended, uncontrollable

1597 consequences. The rational control of the mind was to cede to the real order of

1598 chance; Cage’s chance-protocol experimental procedure harnessed conditions

1599 of indeterminacy as though chanciness were the order of nature. Chance is

1600 deployed, paradoxically and somewhat aporically, as a way to mimic the unin-

1601 telligible (dis)order of nature. But, as Duchamp’s ‘‘canned chance’’ questioned:

1602 Is nature that disordered; is it not also characterized by pattern, repetition,

1603 structure, and design?

1604 If Cage sought to collapse the distinction between art and life, such a

1605 project could only be accomplished by dissolving art into what he perceived

1606 as the greater chaos of life. As he declared, ‘‘Let life obscure the difference

1607 between life and art.’’152 Yet the question can and should be posed: What

1608 really is the benefit of the sensory overload that Cage evoked in the dissolve

1609 of art into life? As his chance-derived phenomenological overload aimed

1610 to unfocus attention and broaden the boundaries of perception, to many

1611 it may ever more closely resemble entertainment, diversion, and a subject

1612 immersed in a wash of confounding effects that to many is the experience of

1613 ‘‘life’’ in late-capitalist modernity.

1614 In Cage’s chance protocol, he fostered situations of greater indeterminacy

1615 because he believed that acts in the world should be detached, as much as possi-

1616 ble, from fixed or predetermined outcomes. Similar to what philosopher Louis

1617 Althusser, in a series of late essays reexamining aleatory events, once described

1618 as a ‘‘unity of a conjuncture’’ in which many planned and unplanned events

1619 coalesce into unpredictable, immediately experienced presentness, Cage’s

1620 chance protocol intended to unfocus viewers’ attentiveness and diffuse their

1621 concentration in a field of simultaneously occurring events, thereby disrupting

1622 preconceived understandings of the role of causality in maintaining social and

1623 other orders.153

1624 John Cage’s ChanCe ProtoCols 99

1625 Although it is important, as Althusser writes, to ‘‘think the openness of the

1626 world to the event, [to] the as-yet-unimaginable,’’ it may not be possible to prize

1627 Cage’s chance protocol from the quietism about the openness of the world to

1628 chance with which his work is sometimes associated.154 This is a ‘‘Zen’’ quietism

1629 with which Albers, Rainer, and many others have long struggled. In exploring

1630 greater contingency, perhaps Cage can be seen as working in Althusser’s space

1631 of the conjectural, a space of experimentation, openness to the other, and open-

1632 ness to the unknown. That is to say, though the order of the world is fraught

1633 with radical instability, there is the fact of order. But that order is provisional,

1634 and only from a medley of various contingent possibilities comes the necessity

1635 of any one particular order.

1636 Although both the Bauhaus tradition and Cage’s French- and Chinese-in-

1637 spired turn at Black Mountain willfully subordinated subjective expression,

1638 Cage instituted an experimental process based on the investigation of arbitrary

1639 structures and the exploration of extrarational experiences. In contrast, the

1640 model of theatrical experimentation proposed by the Bauhaus—with its tech-

1641 niques of reappraising the conditions of spatial perception, its attention to the

1642 organization of forms and their relations to one another, its careful investigation

1643 of the visual effects of bodily movement, and its charge to spectators that the

1644 rigor of attention in theatrical situations could bring a similar focus to circum-

1645 stances outside a performance—was superseded by the one he put forward.

1646 Between these disparate models exist a range of performance strategies, the

1647 legacies and stakes of which continue to be contested today.

1648100 chapter two